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Abstract

For several decades following its independence from Great Britain, Ghana’s policies
continued to promote over-extraction of natural resources to the detriment of its economy and
rural communities. Agricultural and forestry policy has gradually evolved to foster more
sustainable and equitable practices, as in building partnerships with the private sector to fund
infrastructure improvements. Policy has recently recognized the dire need to adopt agricultural
practices and means of forest resource extraction that are compatible with ecological
stewardship. However, many shortcomings are still apparent. Large logging operations
completely disregard forestry regulations with impunity, whereas rural sustenance extractors are
severely punished in the rare event that policy is actually enforced. Although the severe
disadvantages that agricultural policies had imposed in the 1960s have been partially alleviated,
much improvement is still needed. Recent agricultural policy has recognized the lack of funding
available to invest in more efficient and higher-yielding agricultural practices, but partnerships
with the actual lending institutions do not exist. The scarcity of crucial inputs, such as fertilizer
and technical assistance remains a major problem in the agricultural sector, as the soils are
becoming rapidly depleted, leading to declining crop yields and further encroachment on the 20
percent of forests remaining. Overly ambitious targets and unrealistic policies require more
careful and detailed formulation so that Ghana’s resources can be managed effectively before
famine sweeps the food-insecure country once more.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

West African agriculture was environmentally and economically sustainable prior
to the 1960s (Onyeiwu et al 2010). However, Ghanaian agriculture and forestry are both
currently managed in a wasteful and inefficient manner. Ghana’s forested lands have
decreased from 8.2 million hectares in 1957 (Onyeiwu et al 2010) to only 1.6 million as
of year 2000 (McDermott 2009). The approximate three percent annual deforestation
rate continues to diminish forested lands further. Recent measures indicate that 28
percent of Ghana’s forests were lost between 1990 and 2005, landing it at the world’s
fifth-worst rate of deforestation during this period (McDermott 2009), following a ten
percent decrease in natural forests between 1980 and 1990 (Ascher 1995). Of the “40
main marketable” lumber species, 16 are being cut highly in excess of what can be
sustained (Glastra 1999: 84).
This rapid deforestation carries with it severe consequences beyond the waste of
potentially valuable resources. Vegetation naturally regulates water supply and prevents
erosion, so its destruction carries major ecological, economic, and human health
implications. High risk of wood fuel shortages, increased sediment deposits, floods,
landslides, disappearance of water bodies, drought, dam siltation, increased prevalence of
water-borne disease, bushfires (Agbosu 1983) and biodiversity loss are but a few (Food
and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 2004).
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Ecology
Over 90 percent of Ghana’s forests have been cut since the 1940s. Ghanaian
primary forests, which are ecologically superior to secondary forests (in carbon
sequestration and biodiversity measures), basically disappeared in the 1980s (Glastra
1999: 76). Only approximately 20 percent of Ghana is forested at all (Trading
Economics 2010).
Deforestation degrades the land through soil erosion, nutrient depletion, and
desertification. Rainfall in Ghana has been declining by about 2.4 percent each decade
since 1960. Northeastern Nigeria has been experiencing similar problems. In addition,
the wet season has been shorter but more intense, resulting in increased runoff, flooding,
and erosion, and decreased “infiltration”, all of which has been intensified by the lack of
vegetation (Onyeiwu et al 2010).
Declining soil quality is one of Ghana’s major problems. “Slash and burn”
agriculture, a practice in which most Ghanaians engage (Appiah et al 2007), is often
identified as one of the main causes. Fires can be used in hunting and to strategically
alter plant species compositions and eliminate pests. In addition, they are often used to
get rid of brush and felled trees, which create uncontrolled fire hazards. Though fires 200
degrees Celsius or cooler are beneficial to the soil, those above 400 degrees Celsius
diminish soil quality, as they “completely destroy the soil organic matter and reduce the
cation exchange capacity” (Nsiah-Gyabaah 1996). Improper fire management is
common, so the soil is often harmed.
While swidden agriculture often degrades the soil and contributes to deadly
bushfires, the practice is not inherently destructive; if a given land area is not
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overpopulated, the soil nutrients can be sustained (Science Daily 2010). However,
population pressures in Ghana greatly exceed the carrying capacity of the land, especially
when coupled with poor management practices.
Crop rotation rarely implemented. Practically all soil nutrients “show a deficit”,
since erosion and over-harvesting use more than are being provided in fertilizers. Since
fertilizer imports were reduced and subsidies eliminated in the 1980s, the price prohibits
most farmers from enriching their soils. Between 1978 and 1993, fertilizer use declined
by roughly two-thirds. Nitrogen could easily be captured from human waste, but it
instead is disposed of improperly, posing a health hazard. Due to rapid population
growth, the soil is allowed only 2-3 years to fallow after 1-3 years of cropping, although
eight to 15 years are needed “to regenerate soil fertility” (Onyeiwu et al 2010). This
diminishing soil quality leads to lower crop yields, economically straining the rural poor
further.

Soil/fertilizer
Since subsidization of agricultural inputs (particularly fertilizers) ceased in 1983,
they have been used sparingly. A 2004 study conducted on maize, Ghana’s most
important food crop, affirmed the importance of fertilizer. It discovered that the
progressive productivity decline in recent years was due to poor soil quality and lack of
fertilizer; these are “the most important factors affecting maize yield”. The major
problems with the soil were found to be soil organic carbon, ECEC (which illustrates the
soil’s ability to prevent positively charged ions from leaching out [Espinoza et al 2008]),
and clay. Hence, soil management that does not adversely affect soil organic matter and
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water holding capacity should be promoted (Braimoh and Vlek 2004). Removal of
subsidies to agricultural inputs has almost certainly cost society more (by environmental
degradation, other wasted resources, diminished food security, etc.) than the subsidies
would have.
Unfortunately, specific erosion and water pollution data are not readily available,
due to the lack of research and information that hinders Ghanaian policymaking. These
data would provide invaluable insight into optimal land management practices and be
extremely helpful in forming effective forestry and agricultural policy.

Economics
Ghana’s economy relies heavily upon agriculture and forestry; the agricultural
and forestry sector contains 60 percent of Ghana’s workforce (WorldFacts 2008). Forests
provide approximately 75 percent of Ghana’s energy, and they are the primary source of
“food, clothing, shelter, furniture, water-supply sources, bushmeat, and traditional
medicine for the local community” (Glastra 1999: 76, 84). However, the percentage of
land area devoted to agriculture is increasing rapidly; cultivated lands rose from 51
percent of Ghana in the late 1960s to 65 percent in 2005. Despite this rapid growth,
agriculture’s contribution to GDP declined; agriculture accounted for 46 percent of the
GDP in 1969 but only 37 percent in 2005 (Onyeiwu et al 2010). This indicates that
increasingly more resources are used to create decreasing levels of output.
Agriculture cannot be easily sustained in nutrient-poor tropical soils, and most of
the forestry resources previously available to Ghanaians have been destroyed; 85 percent
of locals surveyed can no longer obtain food that was available in the forests 20 years
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before. It has also been noted: “loss of forest cover in Ghana has had an adverse effect
on agricultural productivity and the environment” (Appiah et al 2007). Since Ghanaians
increase agriculture to compensate for decreased food sources in the forests, which in
turn decreases agricultural activity, a vicious cycle is perpetuated.
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and the Import-Substitution Industrial
(ISI) strategy have also contributed to Ghana’s rampant deforestation. The ISI strategy’s
aim was to bolster the economy by encouraging industrialization to decrease foreign
dependency. Because funds earned in the agricultural sector were used to finance this
industrialization and crops were subsidized to lower urban living expenses (and
subsequently product prices), agriculture was harmed. Farmers’ incomes plummeted,
though the world prices of the cash crops were rising. Because the prices of
manufactured goods were simultaneously increasing, the living conditions of rural
inhabitants worsened. Infrastructural development was also emphasized in urban areas
and neglected in the rural parts. Regardless of the efforts, industrial activity remained
poor (Onyeiwu et al 2010).
Ghana also enacted an SAP and the World Bank’s Export Rehabilitation Project
(1983-86) to expand logging operations (Onyeiwu et al 2010). This also improved the
economy, though millions of dollars in illegal logging profits disappeared from Ghana
because of corruption and fraud. The SAP increase forestry products’ contribution to
GDP from three to four percent in the 1980s to six to eight percent. However, this was
“achieved by logging the forest at unsustainable rates”. Wood was priced below its real
market value and production has been wasteful and inefficient; hence, the forests are
exploited above economically beneficial amounts (Glastra 1999: 83).
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Price controls and marketing boards that funneled most of the profits away from
the farmers were removed under the SAP (Glastra 1999: 49). However, rural to urban
migration continued to increase, since the consumer price index for items in rural areas
increased drastically. In addition, subsidization for governmentally-provided social
services and agricultural inputs was eliminated or drastically reduced, which also greatly
increased the rural cost of living. The agricultural sector was greatly weakened,
increasing rural poverty. Ecologically unsustainable use of natural resources has been
driven by these things; over-logging for charcoal production to fuel cooking and other
domestic activities is one of many common practices that exemplify this (Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 2010).
These problems already affect the nation’s youth. Half of the children in rural
areas and approximately one-fifth of the urban child population were engaged in
economic activities in 2001. Approximately 60 percent worked in agriculture, forestry
and fishing activities (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 2010).
This has limited educational opportunities for many of the children, in both the near and
extended future. Therefore, future generations are trapped into agricultural and forestry
activities. These individuals also remain unaware of more efficient and sustainable
practices.

Illegal practices
Rampant poaching and unregulated tree-felling are common practices in Ghana
(Appiah et al 2007). A 1994 Forestry Department study estimated 34 percent of logs to
be illegally harvested. “The main collaborators with illegal chain-saw operators are
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district forestry officials, district chief executives and assembly people, law enforcement
agents, chiefs and village elders, concessionaires, and wood sellers” (Glastra 1999: 83).
Restricted forest management decisions and use have driven many Ghanaians to engage
in illegal forestry practices, which lead to nearly complete degradation of those resources.

Nutrition and Livelihood
Though Ghanaians do not suffer from caloric deficits, the typical starchy diet is
deficient in protein and vitamin A, which has led to stunted growth and blindness. The
forests formerly provided a more balanced diet, but much of the previously available food
resources have been overexploited (Onyeiwu et al 2010).
In addition, the majority of rural Ghanaians lives from “hand-to-mouth”; a large
proportion of the population is in a very precarious position, especially considering the
rapidly declining forest resources and agricultural productivity. The forests continue to
be the only source of wood for fuel, construction, and furniture for most Ghanaians
(Appiah et al 2007). With an average annual income of $248 US (2004) for most
farmers and a GDP per capita of $1500 US (2009) (Central Intelligence Agency 2011) for
the nation, many rural Ghanaians’ best option is forest collection, which costs nothing
(Appiah et al 2007). Due to declining resources, some rural inhabitants walk 12 hours to
collect enough fuel wood to satisfy daily needs: “many Ghanaians and Nigerians enjoyed
higher living standards in the 1960s than they did in the 1990s”. People are beginning to
migrate to urban areas because agricultural income is not sufficient and basic services
(such as education and health care) are lacking; only 52 percent of Ghanaians lived in
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rural areas in 2005, though 76 percent did in 1961. In addition, 70 percent of urban
Ghanaians live in slums (Onyeiwu et al 2010).

Basic causes of deforestation
The factors contributing to Ghana’s high rates of deforestation are diverse. Rapid
population growth, land conversion to agriculture and livestock operations, unchecked
tree felling, previous governmental policies (Food and Agricultural Organization of the
United Nations 2004), mining, and forest fires all play large roles (Okrah 1999).
Charcoal (along with other fuel wood) use, which is rural Ghana’s primary means of
fueling cooking operations, also amplifies the problem; roughly 0.1 hectares of forest
must be consumed to produce one ton of charcoal (Enterprise Works Ghana 2010), since
wood must be burned in extremely hot kilns to create charcoal (Resch 2007).
The greatest contributor to deforestation is the sale of agricultural and timber
products to outsiders. In itself, timber extraction causes approximately 70 percent of
Ghana’s deforestation (Okrah 1999), and most of these products are exported to the USA
and Europe. In addition, loggers receive lengthy concessions, some of which last longer
than 50 years, and these parties undergo “little or no monitoring” (Resch 2007).
The timber industry is comprised of approximately 500 logging companies, some
of which are European-owned, that operate through long-term concessions and short-term
licenses. Some concessions are also too small to allow for proper management practices
to be employed; some are as small as 2km2. Because of inefficient logging techniques
and wasteful timber processing, final lumber volume is only 25 to 40 percent of the total
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log volume extracted” (Glastra 1999: 77). Another ten to 15 percent of Ghana’s
deforestation can be attributed to forest fires (Nsiah-Gyabaah 1996).
Tree plantations are also problematic; some view these as equivalent to forests,
though their ecological impacts are very dissimilar (Okrah 1999). The Ghanaian
government has established a fund to promote plantation establishment, and the president
appealed to poor community landowners to release land for this purpose (Okrah 1999).
The impacts of human settlement are not negligible, but some must rely forest
lands for their livelihoods, and these effects are “comparatively minimal, and in some
cases traditional methods of sustainability are applied” (Okrah 1999). The most severe
deforestation is orchestrated by those who do not live in and rely upon the forests. Lack
of dependence upon the land decreases incentives to employ sustainable practices.
The establishment of forest reserves has been inadequate in the struggle against
rampant deforestation. Within forest reserves, only two percent is in excellent condition,
14 percent of the forest reserve land has no forest, 15 percent is in very bad condition, 20
percent is mostly degraded, 35 percent is partly degraded, and 14 percent is moderate
(Blay et al 2009).
Ghanaian agricultural and forestry policy has evolved to adopt more of a focus on
sustainable agriculture and forestry. However, implementation is lacking. Funding and
enforcement of regulations are especially limited.
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Chapter 2: Socio-Economic Impacts

Major measures of economic well-being have significantly improved, most
notably during the 1990s. However, agricultural productivity is rapidly declining, the
majority of forest resources have been depleted, and policies have neglected the smallscale forestry and agricultural actors that carry the most promise for sustained activity.
The improvements are generally due to policies that push excessive resource exploitation.
Adequate nutrition, though one of the most basic determinants of well-being, has been
largely ignored by agricultural policy, and these negative impacts are very apparent.

Nutrition
The agricultural sector directly and strongly impacts a society’s quality of
nutrition, as it determines which foods are produced and the relative affordabilities.
Processing of raw food inputs, which agricultural policy continues to promote, has
immense nutritional implications, as nutrients are often lost.
Although the typical Ghanaian caloric intake is adequate, malnutrition, mostly
due to inadequate micronutrient consumption, is an underlying factor of many deaths in
Ghana. Food security is also problematic, particularly in the Northern and Upper East
regions (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 2009: 3). Since at
least 1966, the average Ghanaian caloric intake has had approximately the same
composition: 79 percent carbohydrates, 12 percent fats, and nine percent proteins (Food
and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 2009: 19). However, it is
recommended that 45 to 65 percent of an adult’s caloric intake come from carbohydrates,
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20 to 35 percent from fats, and ten to 35 percent from proteins (Institute of Medicine,
Food and Drug Board 2002). These imbalances, along with vitamin and mineral
deficiencies, cause and exacerbate various health problems. For example, vitamin A
(sufficient consumption of which is necessary for healthy immune system function)
cannot be absorbed without consumption of fats, so inadequate fat intake diminishes the
body’s ability to process nutrients (ORC Macro 2005: 36). Children are particularly
vulnerable: in 1988, 31 percent of children were “stunted” and eight percent “wasted”1
(Rawlings 1996: 22). These figures remained mostly unchanged as of 2003, at 29 percent
and seven percent, respectively. Approximately 22 percent of children younger than five
years are deemed underweight (compared with two percent in a well-nourished
population) and three percent are overweight (ORC Macro 2005: 14).
In a nutritional study conducted in 2003, approximately 20 percent of the children
surveyed between the ages zero months and five years died. However, the typical underfive mortality rate in Ghana has been estimated to be at 11 percent. Though still quite
high, this is at the lower end for sub-Saharan African countries. Infectious diseases are
the main cause of death in this age category, and (even minor) malnutrition is an indirect
cause of this, as it increases the children’s susceptibility. It has been estimated that 40
percent of deaths before age five are related to severe and moderate malnutrition, with
moderate malnutrition a factor in 88 percent of malnutrition-related deaths. Between 0
and 20 months, the minority of children (45 percent) is alive and not malnourished (ORC
Macro 2005: 5-10).

1

“Wasting” is an indicator of acute malnutrition, in which a child is far too light than is healthy for his/her
height. In a healthy population, this figure is at about two percent (ORC Macro 2005: 14).
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Chronic malnutrition (as evidenced by stunting) was four percent lower during the
mid-1990s than in 1988. However, between 1998 and 2003, this has increased by three
percent. There was a two percent decrease in acute malnutrition, but this figure fluctuates
greatly. The percentage of underweight children, however, drastically decreased between
1988 and 2003, down from 30 to 22 (ORC Macro 2005: 16).

Poverty alleviation during the 1990s
An annual growth rate of five percent during the 1990s was mainly attributed to
the Structural Adjustment Program created to mitigate for the economic crisis of the
1980s (Jeffrey 2009). However, the 1991 Medium-Term Agricultural Development
Program and related policies also played a large role. The 1991-2 and 1998-9 Ghana
Living Standards Surveys (GLSS) showed that the percentage of Ghanaians below the
poverty line (900 current Cedis annually) fell by 12 percent during that period. Areas
that produced cocoa experienced the most rapid poverty alleviation, but many other crops
boomed. Cassava production has increased by 400 percent and corn production by 300
percent. However, the expansion in growing areas responsible for this success cannot
continue for much longer; forest reserves and “marginal lands” are encroached as farmers
try to expand their lands, leading to vast deforestation and land degradation. Poverty
even increased among food crop farmers in the North, where the land is not conducive to
an expansionary strategy (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
Both national income and national disposable income greatly increased (relative
to 1975 prices) throughout the 1980s and 1990s. With a few exceptions (such as a 1991
decrease), real agricultural income has been increasing since 1984. However, the annual

12

growth rates in real income, real disposable income, and real agricultural income declined
during the 1990s (Asuming-Brempong 2003).

Other livelihood measures
Several other indicators of well-being have been improving recently. In 1996,
only 53 percent of the adult population was literate, with 57 percent of the school-aged
population enrolled (Rawlings 1996: 7). There has been a minor improvement: 57.9
percent of the adult population is now literate (Central Intelligence Agency 2011). Life
expectancy has also improved from 55 years in 1996 (Rawlings 1996: 21) to 61 years in
2011 (Central Intelligence Agency 2011). Both are a vast improvement from the 45 year
expectancy of 1957 Ghana and significantly exceed the African average of 51 years.
However, the average among all developing countries is 63 years and industrialized
countries enjoy a life expectancy of 75 years (Rawlings 1996: 21), so there is much room
for improvement. Although Ghana continues to suffers from high rates of infant and
child mortality, infant mortality decreased to approximately one in 20 (2011) from one in
ten (1996) (Central Intelligence Agency 2011).

Macroeconomic measures
Growth of real GDP decreased from an annual rate of 5.7 percent between 1989
and 1989 to four percent between 1996 and 2001, which caused the rate of employment,
overall labor productivity, and investment to decrease. However, the national savings to
GDP ratio has been increasing since a 4.4 percent low in 1993 (a sharp decline from 9.2
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percent in 1990). Agriculture has remained at approximately 40 percent of the GDP from
2000 to 2008 (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
Agricultural output has a strong inverse relationship with inflation rates, as food
comprises a major proportion of spending. Inflation steadily decreased from 122.8
percent annually in 1983 to 10 percent in 1985, in part due to improved weather
conditions (primarily increased precipitation), which caused the domestic price of food to
fall. But between 1986 and 2000, the annual rate of inflation fluctuated between 10.1
percent and 70.8 percent (Asuming-Brempong 2003).

Exchange rate
The Cedi drastically depreciated in relation to the US Dollar between 2000 and
2004. The volume of exported goods in 2004 was subsequently triple its 1996 value.
However, imports of “import substitutes” like rice, poultry, and tomato paste also surged
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 57). From 2000 to 2006, the effective real
exchange rate was on the rise, reducing competitiveness of exports. However, from 2007
through 2009, it steadily decreased (Index Mundi 2010).

The neglected rural population and potential for agriculture
Accra is now growing at approximately 4.4 percent annually (2003), compared to
3.3 percent in 1984 (the national population growth rates were 2.5 percent and 2.6
percent, respectively) (Asuming-Brempong 2003). Rural areas tend to be
disproportionately more economically disadvantaged and house 80 percent of Ghana’s
poor (Rawlings 1996: 17). In rural areas, 34 percent of rural children are stunted,
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compared to 20 percent of children in large city areas and 26 percent in towns (ORC
Macro 2005: 74). Safe water access is greatly imbalanced as well: 93 percent of urban
and 39 percent of rural had “nominal access” (Rawlings 1996: 22)
However, rural areas support the bulk of Ghana’s economy. The agricultural
sector contributed between 33.9 percent and 38.5 percent of the country’s foreign
exchange earnings between 1999 and 2002 (Asuming-Brempong 2003). However, most
Ghanaians are eager to seek occupations in other sectors; the non-agricultural segment of
the population (which is primarily urban) has been growing at about 3.2 percent annually
(Asuming-Brempong 2003).

Agricultural sector funding
In 1998 and 1999, bank loans to agriculture increased to 12.2 percent of loans (up
from 5.7 percent in 1995), but this percentage has been declining since. Rural banks in
particular have performed slightly better but still leave the agricultural sector with
inadequate funding (Asuming-Brempong 2003). Lending rates from commercial rates
have been astronomically high. The minimum and maximum nominal lending rates
subject to the agricultural sector between 1997 and 2002 ranged from 27 and 50 percent
to 39 and 55 percent. The real rates ranged from approximately seven and 17 percent to
19 and 37 percent (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 2005).
Hence, funding is scarce and expensive.
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The minor input subsidies of 2008 and 2009 were largely ignored
Fertilizer subsidies in 2008 and 2009 based on vouchers given to farmers (with a
unique price set for 50-kilogram bags in each district) had a very small impact on the
agricultural sector. Most fertilizer retailers sold without vouchers: 86 percent of sellers in
2008 and 84 percent in 2009. The vast majority of venders who did not accept vouchers
cited inability to redeem the vouchers as the primary reason for not accepting them, but a
few also stated difficulty of redemption and lack of fertilizer (Krausova and Banful 2010:
26).
The bulk of vouchers received were redeemed through other agricultural input
dealers (47 percent in 2008 and 52 percent in 2009), as most retailers did not have
relationships with fertilizer importers who could redeem the vouchers directly. The
indirect relationships hindered voucher redemption and required trusting a chain of
diluted accountability. Many dealers were compensated for the vouchers with credit (44
percent in 2008 and 47 percent in 2009). Approximately one-fourth of retailers who
participated in 2008 and 2009 received the cash value for the vouchers. However, about
20 percent of retailers were reportedly never paid for at least part of the vouchers
submitted both years, several were forced to redeem the vouchers for other products
instead of cash, and many payments were delayed (Krausova and Banful 2010: 27).

Lack of affordability constrains technological advancement
Lending rates available to the agricultural sector were close to 50 percent annually
in the 1990s. This creates somewhat of a vicious cycle between lack of technology and
lack of funding, and productivity consequently suffers. Available technologies are
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outdated and costly. Foreign firms receive subsidies from their governments and
therefore have more technologically advanced agricultural methods and can more easily
produce higher quality goods at a lower cost (Asuming-Brempong 2003). Furthermore, a
history of political instability, changing policies, and inflation discourage the meaningful
investments necessary to foster sustainable economic growth.
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Chapter 3: Forestry Policy

Forestry policy in Ghana has historically been lacking in its capacity to solve
rampant deforestation. Europeans sought to make money in Ghana and leave as soon as
that was accomplished, so British and other Western forestry companies were not
concerned with long-term ecological impacts. The Ghanaian government also did not
prioritize sustainability: although the state gained independence in 1957 (and therefore
changed in various political, social and economic regards), there was no major forestry
policy review between 1948 and 1992 (Ghana Forestry Commission 2005).

Early policy
While still a British colony (the Gold Coast), Ghana’s first policy relating to
forestry was adopted in 1883. The Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883 enabled
Traditional Councils (comprised of natives) to enact by-laws to protect water courses and
to conserve forests (Agbosu 1983: 169-187). However, the Traditional Councils did not
exercise their power to create reserves. Shortly after, in 1894, the Report of the
Commission on Agricultural Potential of the Gold Coast was published, informing British
business of the economic potentials of the forests and spurring an exponential increase in
timber exports to Europe at the turn of the 20th century.

Large-scale logging policy
The first regulation specifically pertaining to logging was the 1900 Concessions
Ordinance No. 14, which provided Gold Coast citizens the right to grant concessions on
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their own lands as they pleased, so long as this complied with customary law. However,
the concession owners were required to validate the concessions in court within six
months of being granted, posing a major logistical challenge (Adjei 1994). Policy to
control commercial logging of younger trees was introduced in 1907 to enhance forest
regeneration. Since “timber cutters never confined timber felling to trees of full growth”,
the Governor proposed the Timber Protection Ordinance, which prohibited cutting trees
with diameters less than those proposed for each tree species without written permission
by a District Commissioner. A scientific review of the types of trees that could be felled
sustainably was conducted but involved complex observations incomprehensible to local
communities. Another report (by the 1908 Pennington Commission) found that many
timber cutters had no licenses and therefore timber felling regulation was very limited.
Companies and natives alike complained of the regulation; indigenous people had been
felling smaller trees sustainably and relied upon them for certain uses. Hence, this
Ordinance was revoked in 1908 (Agbosu 1983: 169-187).
Nevertheless, governmental control of forests progressively strengthened. The
Forestry Department was created in 1908. Enactment of the 1911 Forest Ordinance
provided the governor power to declare any unoccupied land a forest reservation.
Resource exploitation within these areas required Reserve Settlement Officers’
permission (Adjei 1994).

Forestry Estates
Forestry estates were set aside in 1939, but governmental support backing
enforcement was minimal. Increasing population and agricultural demands, coupled with
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mass disobedience of pre-existing regulations, prompted Ghana's 1948 Forest Policy,
which provided management for permanent forest estates, along with forestry research.
The 1948 policy pushed protection and management of reserves, but all forests outside of
the permanent reserves were left for conversion to agricultural land, and no resources
were provided to implement the law (International Development and Research Centre
2003).

Failure to regulate logging
The 1951 Concessions Ordinance, which required acquisition of timber
concessions, also failed to provide governmental oversight. The concession holders were
required to deliver an annual statement of profits incurred from concessions to the
Treasury. Negligence of this could carry a 50 pound (or $140 current US) fine. One
could also be fined up to five pounds daily for noncompliance with the Ordinance, but it
was mostly ignored, as enforcement was very weak. Since revenue collection was the
priority, timber operations remained unregulated (Agbosu 1983: 169-187).

Policy based on environmental concerns
Other attempts to minimize the ecological impacts of deforestation focused on
scientific forestry initiatives. The 1953 Land Planning and Soil Conservation Act
addressed mitigation and prevention of soil erosion, land reclamation, and water use
(Ghanaian Environmental Protection Agency 1953). Between 1956 and 1970, the
Modified Selection System was implemented through “the selective exploitation of
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mature species, governed by minimum-girth limits” so that the forests could regenerate
(International Development and Research Centre 2003).
Because of this system’s ineffectiveness, the government reverted to simpler,
more direct, and heavy-handed control. The 1959 Protected Timber Lands Act (Act 34)
deemed off-reserve forest land protected timber lands, giving the Forestry Department the
ability to regulate farm development and control agricultural expansion (Kotey et al
1998: 82,100). However, this direct assertion of power was reversed with the 1960
Forests Improvement Fund Act (Act 12), which established a Forest Improvement Fund
(Forestry Commission of Ghana 2000). The FIF was created to “establish an
improvement fund for forest reserves and to provide for the control of revenue derived
from forest reserves” (Odoom 2005: 37). This also severed the Forestry Department’s
management of Forestry Reserves, and accountability to landowners was eliminated
regarding the revenue’s use; the Act eliminated all individual forest reserve account and
previous agreements in the Working Plans that provided state accountability of revenue
(Marfo 2006: 17).
The 1961 Wild Animals Preservation Act enabled the minister to appoint honorary
game officers (Government of Ghana 1961: 2). Hunting “trophy” export was prohibited
unless a permit was granted by a superior police officer. Hunting via motor vehicles
(including aircraft) and strategic fire setting was also prohibited in this act. Arrests
without warrant were also permitted (Timber Industry Development Division 2009). But
it was not until four years later, in 1965, when the Department of Game and Wildlife was
deemed an official Ministry of Forestry agency (International Development and Research
Centre 2003).
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Communally-owned lands
The 1962 Administration of Lands and Concessions Acts further deprived rural
communities of previous rights. The Administration of Lands Act (Act 123) enabled the
federal government to manage community-owned lands and collect revenues from them
(Amoako-Nuama 1999: 6). The Concessions Act (Act 124) provided timber concessions
and central governmental management of timber resources, both on and outside of
reserves (Odoom 2005: 32). Hence, the combined impact of the 1962 acts prohibited
farmers from using trees on their properties.

Timber marketing control
In 1963, the Ghana Timber Marketing Board was established to regulate timber
and wood product exportation (Timber Industry Development Division 2009). The
Timber Operations (Government Participation) Decree of 1972 provides the Ghanaian
government power to be the majority shareholder, hold governing board positions, and
engage in general management of timber companies (Government of Ghana 1972). The
Forest (Protection) Decree of 1974 also greatly limits community use of forest reserves
and establishes Forest Officers’ powers. Criminal penalties for violations of forestry
laws (including “damaging of trees, cultivation, creating fires, obstructing of water flows,
hunting or fishing or grazing or trespassing of cattle”) in a Forest Reserve were
introduced. However, collection of non-timber forestry products for domestic use only
was permitted (Forestry Commission of Ghana 2000).
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Strict policy
The 1974 Trees and Timber Act (N.R.C.D. 273) attempted to improve inspection
effectiveness by dividing Ghana into forestry regions. Property registration was
mandated before tree felling was permissible. Logs were required to be labeled with the
cutter’s property mark, which is given during registration with the office of the Forestry
Commission (Government of Ghana 1972). The registration fee for a property was
400,000 Ghanaian Cedis (roughly the same equivalent in current USD). The registrations
expired every six months from the date of issue, and the renewal registration fee was
200,000 Cedis. This was later amended to last for two years. If the application was made
after the registration expired, the registration fee was 400,000 Cedis. Arrest without
warrant by a “police officer or forest officer or a person authorized by the Minister” was
declared legal if “that officer or person reasonably suspects” that the suspect “committed
or have been concerned (sic) in the commission of an offence” under the Trees and
Timber Act, if the suspect does not give a name and address for the timber (or gives a
name and address that is suspected to be false), or “if there is reason to believe that the
suspected person may abscond”. However, the person may not be held for more than 48
hours before being released or taken before a Magistrate (Government of Ghana 1974).
In addition, felling timber for export without a valid property mark became a criminal
offense (Kotey 1998: 82).
The 1977 Amendment to the Timber Industry and Ghana Timber Marketing
Board Decree (SMDC 128) prohibited exportation of any timber products by any entity
other than the Ghana Timber Marketing Board (or parties authorized by it). This carried
a potential prison sentence of 15-30 years. The Timber Marketing Board also set the
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prices of timber for domestic sales and held the power to determine the percentages of
products that timber processors could sell domestically and abroad. The Minister was
also provided with the power to create regulations for the Act’s enforcement
(Government of Ghana 1977).

Chainsaw regulation
Chainsaw ownership requires registration with the District Assembly. Wood
harvested with a chainsaw may only be used “for social or community purposes and shall
not be sold or exchanged” (Forestry Commission of Ghana 1998). Some reasons to ban
chainsaw felling are: higher levels of waste, greater risk of wildfires, and faster felling
(Parker 2011). However, roughly 78 percent of domestically purchased timber was felled
by chainsaw (Forestry Commission of Ghana 2010).
The 1982 Timber Concession Revesting Law (PNDCL 17) removed 1,473 square
miles of timber felling land from indigenous logging companies (Daily Graphic 2003).
Subsequently, illegal chainsaw timber felling drastically increased.
1991 marked the first of eight years during which chainsaw use was legalized
through a permit-based system (Odoom 2005: 42-8). This was to support the
construction boom. However, more trees were felled than were approved by permits; this
was related to the log export boom to Asia (42). Permit issuance was “streamlined” in
1994, but the accompanying inspections to verify legal compliance were not carried out,
due to limited resources by enforcement agencies. To mitigate for practically
unrestrained chainsaw timber felling, “timber task forces” were created in 1996.
Although those who assisted in the arrests of chainsaw operators were given 30 percent
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of seized timber, many members of the Forestry Commission and other enforcement
agencies collaborated with illegal operators. Finally, the Legal Instrument 1518 was
repealed, and LI 1649—which outlawed chainsaw harvesting—was enacted. Legal
Instrument 1649 also addressed the problem of corruption among enforcers (43).
However, chainsaw operations are reportedly increasing (44).
When the contractor ceased operation, the Chief Conservator of Forests (with the
approval of the Forestry Commission) was permitted to cut remaining wood, with
branches and scraps given to benefit the forest community. Certain species could not be
logged without a special permit; otherwise this was considered an offense. Offenses and
penalties were given for: obstruction of Forestry Department or Forest Products
Inspection Bureau inspections, possession of improperly labeled or unmarked timber,
possessing timber without a conveyance certificate, owning an unregistered chainsaw,
using an unregistered chainsaw, failing to properly mark felled timber, selling timber
felled with a chainsaw, permitting unregistered chainsaw felling on one’s property, and
felling or possessing felled timber of a “restricted species”. Officers who aided those
breaking regulations were also liable and guilty of an offense (Forestry Commission of
Ghana 1998).
Communities organize to illegally demand rent from timber companies. In doing
so, they “are tacitly supporting raids of company concessions by chainsaw operators –
who at least pay rent up front” (Odoom 2005: 38-9). In addition, “many landowners and
farmers would rather negotiate secretly with chain-saw operators to have the trees on
their land illegally harvested than allow the legitimate concessionaires to harvest the trees
and pay token compensation”. Timber dealers who do not cut locally own 60-80 percent
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of chainsaws. These chainsaw timber dealers reap all of the benefits while the local
inhabitants only transport the equipment and wood for short-distance carries. Although
chainsaw-cut timber is illegal, it comprises 70 percent of locally-sold timber (Odoom
2005: 7-8).

Bushfires
Seasonal bushfires between 1982 and 1984 were particularly destructive; between
1982 and 1983, roughly 50 percent of Ghana’s vegetation and 35 percent of its crops and
agricultural stores were destroyed (Ampadu-Agyei 1988). Human activities that
contribute to bushfires include clearing the land for cultivation, flushing out game,
protection against dangerous animals, cooking, carrying fire brands, grudge fires to settle
disputes, smoking, religious and ceremonial practices, and deliberately sparked fires to
avoid repaying loans used to finance rice farms. PNDC (Peoples National Defense
Council) Law 46 (1983) prohibited the setting of bushfires except for certain agricultural,
forestry, and game management uses. The 1983 Control of Bush Fires Law criminalized
“intentional, reckless, or negligent” cause of bushfires and held offenders liable for all of
the fires’ repercussions (Kotey et al 1998: 82). Though the penalties were strict and the
government followed through with enforcement actions, bushfires remain a major
problem (Daily Graphic 2003).
Unlike its 1983 predecessor, the 1990 Control and Prevention of Bushfires Law
(PNDCL 229) aimed to regulate and prevent bushfires through public awareness and
district assembly-controlled burning rather than imposing harsh penalties to the
offenders. PNDCL 192 marked a great improvement over the failure to address bushfires
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with undetermined fault in PNDCL 46. However, PNDCL 229 did not specify which
agency would implement the law or even how this would be performed (Ghanaian
Environmental Protection Agency 1990).

Mining
Although mining has detrimental effects on forested lands, it was deregulated in
1983 to spark economic activity. Mining activity (especially small-scale efforts)
skyrocketed (Library of Congress 2010).
The Minerals and Mining Act (Act 703, 2006) “states that a mineral right holder
has sufficient authority to enter the land in respect of which the right is granted subject to
negotiating compensation with affected farmers (Section 73) and paying compensation
based on compensation principle” (Ghana News Agency 2010a). Every mineral (in its
natural state) belongs to the government of Ghana. The government can also claim land
when necessary to extract the minerals. Mining activities may also be prohibited on
certain lands. The government has complete control over granting mining rights, and
possessing those rights gives complete water use rights as well (Government of Ghana
2006: 5).

Major restructuring
Due to the 1948 Forest Policy’s failure, the Forestry Department began to review
its practices in 1984. This led to some restructuring within the organization. The Timber
Export Development Board Law of 1985 (PNDCL 123) established the Timber Industry
Development Division (TIDD), which functions to promote and develop timber
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marketing (Appiah 1999, Ghana Forestry Commission 2005). TIDD is one of the three
“operational elements” of the Ghana Forestry Commission (the other two are the Forest
Services Division and the Wildlife Division) (Ghana Forestry Commission 2005).
PNDCL 123 and PNDC Law 117 replaced the 1963-established GTMB with the Timber
Export Development Board (TEDB) and the Forest Products Inspection Bureau (FPIB)
(Timber Industry Development Division 2009).

World Bank-funded projects of the late 80s and early 90s
The World Bank financed a $24 million project for the importation of logging
equipment in 1986 to bolster Ghana’s struggling economy (Ampadu-Agyei 1988). To
mitigate for the resulting acceleration in deforestation (in part due to the World Bank
project), the 1989-1997 Forest Resources Management Project was introduced,
establishing several water protection laws. However, there was no clear cut policy or
financial commitment.
The 1989-92 Forest Resource Management Project supported implementation of a
“sustained yield policy”. Forestry conservation and tree planting on farms were
encouraged. The policy was backed by creating a rural forestry program, initiatives to
support forestry education and research, and strengthening forestry institutions (World
Bank 2000a).

Efforts for improved implementation
The 1991 National Environmental Action Plan was created to address ecological
problems in the areas of land management, water resource management, marine and
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coastal ecosystems, mining and hazardous chemicals, human settlement, and forestry and
wildlife (Benneh 2011). The Environmental Protection Council was to report and
coordinate actions to enforce NEAP, but the Council had no enforcement powers
(Library of Congress 2010).
Previous legislation created 282 forest reserves and 15 wildlife protected areas;
these comprise over 38,000 km or about 16 percent of land area. Outside of these
reserves, roughly 4,000 km of forest were rapidly disappearing and lacking protection.
To address this problem, Article 269 of the 1992 Constitution established the Forestry
Commission, along with its functions and structure (International Development and
Research Centre 2003). The 1993 Forestry Commission Act (Act 453) reinforced this
(Kotey et al 1998: 83).

Forest and Wildlife Policy (1994)
The 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy, which is mainly still in effect, was a major
reformation of Ghana’s outdated forestry regulations, most of which originated during
colonial times. Environmental impact statements were introduced. National lands were
reserved for mixed uses, though mostly for exploitation of forest resources. Unclaimed
lands became regulated by the Forestry Department. These forests, forest reserves, and
wildlife protected areas became managed under “detailed prescriptions… to guide
sustainable management”, and more effective enforcement mechanisms, such as periodic
audits of forestry operations, were specified. Timber rights were awarded by competitive
bidding and forest and wildlife fees were regularly reviewed to reflect economic value,
increasing revenue collection. Timber processing, improved milling efficiency, and
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exploitation of lesser-used timber species were also encouraged through various
initiatives, such as specialized training programs for wood processing operators and
produce graders. Wild animal production and forest plantations were other state-funded
forestry investments (International Development and Research Centre 2003).
The policy aimed to “sustainably develop wildlife potential”, regulating trade and
consumption of “highly valued” and endangered species. A National Parks and protected
areas network (along with its proposed management practices) was established, along
with national tree planting programs (International Development and Research Centre
2003).
Public awareness and local community participation in natural resource protection
and land reservations were promoted. Various stakeholder groups were required to be
integrated in consultations (though the Forestry Commission and district conservation
committees) to address the problems of wildfires in at-risk areas, illegal farming and
encroachment upon protected areas, and pollution. In addition, local access to traditional
uses of forestry products and participation in policy formation was improved, and
farmers’ land and tree tenure rights were restored (International Development and
Research Centre 2003). Bureaucratic controls on the marketing of wood exports were
weakened while dialogue with the private sector was enhanced. Ironically, there was
little stakeholder consultation during the policy’s development.
Inter-ministerial cooperation and maintenance of an interagency coordinating
committee was promoted. Accordingly, a holistic research database for forestry and
wildlife studies was proposed. In addition, human resource development programs were
implemented to improve planning and management in the private sector and
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communities. The policy also aimed to improve dialogue with international entities,
trade associations, private interest groups, and NGOs concentrated on sustainable natural
resource management (International Development and Research Centre 2003).
The Forestry and Wildlife Departments were reorganized to improve “monitoring,
coordination, and accountability”. Likewise, previous legislative and administrative
means were reviewed. Adequate funding was arranged for resource management.
Accounting practices were also improved, enhancing accuracy and collection of resource
utilization revenues (International Development and Research Centre 2003).
NGOs view the policy as a “useful advocacy tool”; the policy adopts collaborative
forestry management (CFM) and studies of “environmental, cultural, scientific, and
social functions of forestry” (Forest Watch Ghana 2006: 21). It also prefers “low volume
high value” timber extraction, which is optimal because it decreases waste. However,
post-1994 legislation did not allow for collaboration with the rural communities (Forest
Watch Ghana 2006: 22).

Further support of the Policy
Several laws and plans institutionalize the Forest and Wildlife Policy. The 1994
Act 490 established the Ghanaian Environmental Protection Agency, which is stronger
than the Environmental Protection Council (EPC), the previous environmental agency
(Library of Congress 2010, Ghanaian Environmental Protection Agency 2011).
The 1994 Lands Commission Act required the newly formed Lands Commission
to manage public “and any other lands vested in the President by the Constitution” and to
recommend policy regarding land use to the national government (Ghanaian

31

Environmental Protection Agency 2011). In 1995, interim measures were established to
control illegal timber harvesting outside of reserves, enabling farmers to veto timber
felling on their lands and to be compensated for crop damage (Kotey et al 1998: 83).
The 1996 Forestry Development Master Plan was to “guide the implementation of
the Forest and Wildlife Policy” (International Tropical Timber Organization 2006: 99).
The FDMP has three time horizons during which it expects to achieve its objectives
(which are managing and enhancing its forest and wildlife resources, promoting “viable
and efficient” forestry industries [especially promoting more advanced processing],
promoting public awareness and rural involvement in forestry and conservation efforts,
promoting more scientific and technological forestry and wildlife management, and
developing national, regional, and district levels of forest and wildlife management),
spanning the period 1996-2020 (Oduro 2002: 32-34). This makes implementation of the
FDMP more manageable. The 1998 Wildlife Development Plan was created to facilitate
implementation of the 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy (Japan International Cooperation
Agency 1999: 22).

Timber Resources Management Act and Regulations
The Timber Resources Management Act of 1997 introduced Timber Utilization
Contracts (to replace timber concessions) and Social Responsibility Agreements. This
was yet another instance of timber regulations and procedures discriminating against
small-scale efforts. In addition, the new policies were crafted in a way that fosters
arbitrary implementation, increasing the potential for corruption.
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Also in 1997, levies were introduced to exports of nine air-dried timber species
(Forestry Commission of Ghana 1998) and rough log exportation was banned (Benneh
2011). Though annual allowable timber extraction from forest reserves have been more
strictly controlled, harvesting limits outside of reserves have been relaxed to compensate
(Forestry Commission of Ghana 2010).
The 1998 Timber Resources Management Regulations called for inventories to
determine the suitability of lands for timber utilization contracts. The decision is made
by the Chief Conservator of Forests through a field inspection that includes input from
the Traditional Council, land owners (if applicable), and governmental forestry officers.
The District Chief Executive must identify owners and farmers of land for field
inspection. The suitability of the land for timber concessions is judged on “quality,
quantity, and value” of timber, topography, and special characteristics (including water
bodies and roads). Owners are given 21 days to consent to timber rights on the land and
verify that there exist no “conflicting claims” upon that property. The reports pass
through the Forestry Department and eventually to the Chief Conservator of Forests.
However, the notices are only required to be posted at the District Assembly, Traditional
Council, and District Forest offices (Forestry Commission of Ghana 1998); it is unclear
how the typical rural subsistence farming community would ever see these. Obtaining
transportation from the rural communities to these offices is difficult. The law is also
unclear about situations during which the landowners do not respond.
When the landowner objects or there are conflicting claims of interest on the land,
the District Forest Officer must refer the case to a committee, comprised of a
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representative of the Administrator of Stool Lands2, two representative of the District
Assembly, and a Traditional Council representative. The chairman of that committee is
the representative of the Traditional Council. The proceedings are informal and “guided
by natural justice”. If the committee report considers the objection reasonable, it will
forward its recommendation document (which also contains the land survey and
boundary specifications, topographic maps and plans, the consent or objection and
grounds, and conflict resolution if available) to the Regional Forest Officer. The
Regional Forest Officer then reviews the report for accuracy and may include his own
recommendations or exclude those made by the committee. However, the law states that
the conflict or refusal to grant land rights must first be settled and written consent
obtained before the timber utilization contracts are granted. “Where any public identified
as suitable for the grant of timber rights and endorsed by the Chief Conservator of Forests
is also identified by any other state institution to be suitable for some other national
purpose, the matter shall be resolved by the Minister and any other Minister concerned”
(Forestry Commission of Ghana 1998).
Once land ownership has been verified, the land’s information is advertised,
inviting parties to apply for the timber rights (and permitting verification). Requirements
for the submission of each land use application include payment of a fee, evidence of
timber company ownership or forestry partnerships, and proposed operations. The
Timber Rights Evaluation Committee awards points based upon proper completion of the
form, whether the applicant intends to process the wood, the competence and
qualifications of the timber operations staff, the timber operations record of the applicant
(if existent), previous timber rights held, the harvesting plan’s details, financial and
2

“Stool lands” are communally owned properties.
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technical ability to carry out the operations, the environmental impacts, fire protection
plans, economic impacts, suitability of roads and logging equipment, proposed security
measures against illegal encroachment, and proposed disposal of logging and milling
operation remains. Any applicant whose request scores above an arbitrary number of
points determined by the Evaluation Committee is invited to submit proposals on
reforestation and deforestation plans and social responsibility agreements to aid the forest
communities in an amount not exceeding five percent of the annual royalty from
operations under the timber utilization contract operations. The Evaluation Committee
recommends the award to be given to the highest scoring applicant. The Evaluation
Commission then submits the report of the applicants and its recommendations to the
Minister (Forestry Commission of Ghana 1998). Though the process seems to be
competitive, arbitrary cutoffs and subjective requirements promote corrupt awarding of
concessions.
The Attorney General determines various contract conditions, including the size
and limits of the contract area, contract duration, prescriptions by the Forestry
Department to which the contract holder must adhere, rent payment to the landowner,
grounds for termination or suspension of the contracts, and provision of social services to
the communities impacted. Successful applicants must sign a contract agreeing to these
terms with representatives of the communities. District Forest Officers will monitor
compliance within his district, and the Forestry Department will conduct occasional
audits. Inspectors of the Forestry Commission, the Forest Products Bureau, and the
Forestry Department may inspect timber operators to verify that they are producing in
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accordance with their records. Felled trees must all be marked, numbered and
documented (Forestry Commission of Ghana 1998).
The stumpage fee royalties, payable to the landowner, are based upon estimates
prepared by the District Forest Officer (Forestry Commission of Ghana 1998). The stool3
(or other landowner) only receives half of the stumpage fee; the Forestry Commission
collects the other half (Forestry Commission of Ghana 2010). The District Forest Officer
measures the volume of timber within 48 hours of extraction. Timber cannot be moved
unless timber conveyance certificates certify that this has occurred (Forestry Commission
of Ghana 1998).

National Land Policy (1999)
The 1999 National Land Policy prohibited any lands with primary forest cover to
be cleared for the creation of tree plantation or mining activity operations (Japan
International Cooperation Agency 1999: 33). All lands deemed forest reserves are “‘fully
protected’ for ecosystem maintenance, biodiversity conservation, and sustainable timber
production” (Ghana News Agency 2010a). In addition, no timber production activities
are permitted at gradients of 30 degrees and steeper. However, agriculture, mining,
human settlement, and other activities are permitted in those circumstances. Areas within
100 meters of a water body’s “high water mark” were declared “protected areas”
(Amoako-Nuama 1999: 15). An important object of this policy is to “protect the rights of
landowners and their descendants from becoming landless or tenants on their own land”
(Amoako-Nuama 1999: 11). Prohibited activities include wetland drainage, damming
water courses feeding into wetlands, creating settlements and infrastructure in wetlands,
3

“Stool” is a term for the traditional communal land owner.
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waste disposal in the wetlands, and mining in wetlands (Amoako-Nuama 1999: 15).
However, “farming, grazing, fishing, timber production and salt-wining” are permitted in
these areas (Amoako-Nuama 1999: 16).
The government may deem “any land with potential for ecosystem maintenance,
biodiversity or scenic beauty preservation” a protected area. In these cases, the
government must pay annual rent as compensation (Amoako-Nuama 1999: 15).
Ghanaians do not enjoy extensive property rights. Various problems plague land
management, such as “land encroachments, multiple sales of residential parcels,
unapproved development schemes, haphazard development” (Forestry Commission of
Ghana 2010). Because there are no reliable land maps, the boundaries of stool/skin lands
are not clear (Forestry Commission of Ghana 2010). Ownership of vested lands is split
between traditional communities and the government. Some of the payment due to the
landowners from governmental acquisitions is much delayed, placing landowners in a
difficult position. Stool, skin, clan or family land cannot pass to family or descendants
more than what the other land holding community members are entitled to: “unless
approved by the appropriate public authority, no land use change of any kind will be
countenanced”. The government can acquire land whenever it desires, and it also “may
intermediate in facilitating investors’ access to land owned by stools, skins, clans,
families, or individuals” (Forestry Commission of Ghana 2010).

Environmental Permits and Impact Assessments
The 1999 Environmental Assessment Regulation LI 1652 provided for
Environmental Permits (this was lately amended in 2002 with minor logistical changes)
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(Ghanaian Environmental Protection Agency 1999: 1-4). Environmental Permits are
required to “commence or implement an undertaking in Ghana” (Ghanaian
Environmental Protection Agency: 2). When the Environmental Permit is followed
during the undertaking, an Environmental Certificate is granted to that party.
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) are required for “implementation(s) or
development(s) (that) may have significant impact”. Relevant information must be
gathered and analyzed to realize potential consequences, mitigations and alternatives that
should be considered “to ensure environmentally sound and sustainable implementation
or development”. These are publicly available and required to be as comprehensible as
possible (Parker 2011).

Forest Plantation Development Fund
The Forest Plantation Development Fund Act of 2000, which superseded Forest
Improvement Fund Act (1960) and its 1962 amendment (Amoako-Nuama 1999: 25),
creates a fund to assist in the development of private commercial forest plantations
(Forestry Commission of Ghana 2000). This is to develop forest plantations on lands that
are suitable for commercial timber production and to promote research and technical
development in commercial forestry endeavors. Funding for this program is provided by
the 1974 Trees and Timber Decree (via the timber export levy, subject to its 1994
amendments), grants//loans, and parliamentary funding (Forestry Commission of Ghana
2000, Amoako-Nuama 1999: 25). A Fund Management Board (comprised of private
sector, governmental, and donating parties) is required to create a “private sector forest
plantation development scheme” that includes 200,000 or fewer hectares of land for a
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period between 10 and 25 years. Forest plantation inspectors are permitted to visit
beneficiary plantations at any time (Forestry Commission of Ghana 2000).

Replanting
The National Forestry Development Programme, which was enacted by the
President in 2001, aims to replant 20,000 hectares of forest annually (Benneh 2011).
This relies upon private sector participation (Forestry and Agriculture Organization 2008:
1).

Absence of data
Data collected by different environmental agencies is often "guarded rather
jealously" at the expense of efficiency and knowledge transmission. Many of Ghana's
environmental statistics are kept from the public and other agencies (with few
exceptions). International organizations provide much of the available environmental
information. Data are collected inconsistently, preventing trend observations. In
addition, most people are unwilling to provide information, “feeling that the data
collector will use it for a personal financial or prestigious gain so he should pay
something for what he wants to collect". Fear of job loss and disapproval by one's
superiors also discourages provision of information (United Nations 2005: 2-4, 6-7)

Implementation failures
Although recent policies appear to protect Ghana’s forests, they are not actually
implemented. During 2002 and after, the Forestry Commission and commercial loggers
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“simply ignored access restrictions and fiscal measures with impunity”. And in certain
communities, “the state has lost control” over the forestry reserves: there are armed
communities willing “to confront Forestry Commission officials, police, and military to
protect illegal farming activities” (Forest Watch Ghana 2006: 17). Though there is a
provision for “Social Responsibility Agreements” that allocate five percent of timber
companies’ stumpage obligations to support social projects in the companies affected by
their operations, performance cannot be monitored; the communities are unaware of the
stumpage obligations (Appiah 1999). However, new legislation provided farmers the
right to allow or prevent Timber Utilisation Contract holders from felling trees on their
properties.
Only six out of over 600 active timber concession holders registered to pay timber
rights fees. These were mandatory, starting in September 1998, under the Timber
Resources Management Act. The Ministry of Lands, Forestry and Mines and the
Forestry Commission never enforced the permit policy, since industry opposes it and “it
involved a redistribution of resource rent” (Forest Watch Ghana 2006: 12). In addition to
shaping forestry policies and regulations, large logging operations “systematically violate
permit regulations with complete impunity” (Forest Watch Ghana 2006: 9). This logging
industry subsidy costs the government at least $100 million US per year (Forest Watch
Ghana 2006: 12).
The 1998 Timber Resources Management Regulations (LI 1649) created “Timber
Utilization Permits” (TUPs) to allow communities, District Assemblies, and NGOs to use
trees for non-commercial use. However, the regulations outlining these permits are
vague, and communities have been unable to use these permits. Instead, the Forestry
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Commission uses the permits to provide commercial loggers discounted timber; the
Forestry Commission issued 125 TUPs to large logging companies between 2001 and
2003 (Forest Watch Ghana 2006: 11). Practically all regulations apply only to rural
communities, who have little clout.
Furthermore, the Large Taxpayers Office of the Internal Revenue Service
reported that the majority of large logging companies have been registered as “free zone
enterprises” under the Ghana Free Zone Board Act since 2001. This entails a ten-year tax
holiday in lieu of the 30 percent corporate income tax that should apply (Forest Watch
Ghana 2006: 13).

Elimination of Timber Utilisation Contracts
In 2002, the Cabinet approved of the previous government’s recommendations to
revoke Timber Utilisation Contracts, replacing them with competitive bidding (Ghana
News Agency 2002). This is consistent with the 2002 Timber Resources Management
Act (617), which provides “legal basis for competitive bidding” (African Development
Bank Group 2010).

Stricter penalties
The 2002 Amendment of the Forest Protection Act increased penalties for forestry
offenses; fines were increased, and joint liability was introduced. The Community
Forestry Management Project (2003) has four components: integrated forest
management, sustainable livelihood improvement, “capacity building and institutional
strengthening”, and “project management support” (African Development Bank Group
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2010). The project’s aim is to relieve poverty through sustainable forestry development
(via strengthened institutions and increased agricultural and forestry production, coupled
with rehabilitation of damaged reserves). Collaborative forestry management is a
proposed tool. “Smallholders” living near the reserves are expected to plant trees and
produce food crops, which would likely increase their incomes. Establishing
communities’ long-term interest in the trees’ performance is crucial for this to work.
This is also created to narrow the gap between supply and demand of wood in domestic
markets to decrease timber imports. This is funded by the African Development Bank
and aims to rehabilitate six degraded reserves (Forestry Commission of Ghana 2010a).
The Timber Resources Management Regulations were amended in 2003 to
include competitive bidding for timber rights (after passing through a pre-qualification
process) (Forestry Commission of Ghana 2003).

Development of a certification system
The Forestry Commission began to develop a Forest Management Certification
System and a computerized tracking system, under the Validation of Legal Timber
Programme. The objective of this was to verify the legal origin of timber for exportation,
“to secure a bigger and sustainable share of the market through the promotion of verified
legal timber products, and thereby seek the support of the EU to offer sufficient
incentives to the Ghanaian industry to ensure adherence to the licensing scheme”
(GhanaWeb 2005). Ghana exports approximately 60 percent of its wood to the European
Union, and the most profitable contracts are through EU customers (Forest Watch Ghana
2006: 26). Therefore, logging companies have sufficient incentives to comply with the
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Programme. This would place Ghana on track to certify timber exports to the European
Union in accordance with a Voluntary Partnership Agreement. The Programme is
completely funded by the Ghanaian government, with Société Generale providing
technical assistance (GhanaWeb 2005).

Land and taxation policies encourage deforestation
Property can be held by a family for 90 years before ownership is revoked. If
there is a property ownership disagreement following a division, the land reverts back to
the original owners (Ansah 2010). The government occasionally “forcefully obtain(s)
land” from communities to create forestry reserves (Forestry Commission of Ghana
2000). Hence, there is not a strong sense of property security. There is an incentive to
develop land as quickly as possible to place one’s stake on it (Ansah 2010): “with few or
no rights in the reserves, nearby farmers and communities have had no incentives to
protect, manage, or invest in the resource.” (Forestry Commission of Ghana 2000).
However, this does not guarantee anything and is often wasteful. Taxation also
encourages agricultural development: the only items that can be imported duty-free are
agricultural implements of any type (including tractors) and musical instruments. In
addition, self-employed individuals (such as farmers) are not subject to income taxation
(Ansah 2010).

Conclusion
Ghanaian forestry policy has strictly controlled small-scale forestry operations by
rural communities with low ecological impacts. In regard to small-scaled operations,
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“the provision of draconian punishments for the smallest infringement of forest use
restrictions has been the most consistent feature of forestry legislation through the years”
(Forest Watch Ghana 2006: 10). Large loggers operate unchecked, and illegal chainsaw
cutting is a major source of timber. In regards to ecological and rural livelihood
considerations, the policies are often “unbalanced like elephants and ants on cee-saws”
(Genius/GZA 1995).
The corporate sector therefore plays a large role in policymaking and
unsustainably obtains the vast majority of resources with impunity, at the expense of rural
communities. Corruption of the industry and government is a major problem. In order to
make any progress, major policy reform and improved implementation to foster
sustainable practices and fair access to resources is detrimental: “NGOs are not set up to
take on what is essentially a political challenge” (Forest Watch Ghana 2006: 25). Rapid
resource depletion and population growth place increased economic and environmental
strains on Ghana: time is of the essence in crafting viable policy. There are some
concerns about extreme violence, similar to that of Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire (which
were peaceful until a sudden collapse). Ethnic tensions have been increasing, and
“warlords very quickly link up with (or become) natural resource plunderers” (Forest
Watch Ghana 2006: 25).
There is a high degree of official leniency; forestry “reserves” are multi-purposed
and can be legally logged, and policy promotes increased exploitation of forestry
resources with only rehabilitation of degraded resources to mitigate for the negative
ecological impacts. The incentives provided by the policies and extremely limited
enforcement do not yet encourage sustainable development, although that was more of a

44

concern in recent policy. However, forestry policy has not been significantly updated
since the 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy.
Future policy should not repress rural populations; as evidenced by previous
initiatives, overly stringent measures only cause communities to blatantly disregard them
or rebel in order to support their basic needs. Many policies do not attack the real
problem (industry) and would provide insurmountable economic barriers were they to be
followed. Great potential exists in “participatory” development that provides the
communities with some control and community modernization (using the resources they
have) (Forest Watch Ghana 2006: 17). However, funding effective and sustainable
forestry policy remains a challenge: “It's hard to be legit and still pay tha rent” (Tupac
1993).
Agricultural policy has had the same history of slow improvement, peppered with
a few major failures. As with forestry policy, there still remains much room for
improvement, particularly in implementation.
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Chapter 4: Agricultural Practices and Policies4

As the dominant economic sector with great cultural significance, agriculture is a
vital component of Ghana’s livelihood. Approximately 60 percent of Ghana’s workforce
operates in the agricultural and forestry sector, with 64 percent of Ghana’s wealth in crop
lands. Most of Ghana’s poor live in rural areas and are food crop farmers; “any
intervention in agriculture… can have (a) profound effect on poverty alleviation among
the rural” (Asuming-Brempong 2003). Agriculture has a unique ability to provide social
stabilization, buffer shocks in the economy against deterioration in living standards,
improve environmental sustainability, and foster cultural values. However, lack of
financial adaptability from the predominant “hand-to-mouth” form of livelihood leaves
many vulnerable to fluctuations in economic and weather conditions and with practically
no room to respond. Because of its deep-rooted dependence upon agriculture, which is
experiencing steady declines in both land availability and productivity (due to limited
access to proper inputs), Ghana is in a precarious situation, although the vast majority of
the population enjoys relative economic prosperity now.
Agricultural productivity is largely based upon the natural resources available to
the region. Improper use of shifting cultivation and diminishing forest cover put Ghana
at risk; 69 percent of its total land surface area is “prone to severe erosion”; this reduces
annual GDP by two percent (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 61). Overgrazing
increases the problem; much of the lands are communal and lack designated livestock

4

Unless otherwise noted, the information in Chapter 4 is based upon: Ministry of Food and Agriculture.
Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP II): Republic of Ghana, 2007.
www.mofa.gov.gh/FASDEP%20II.
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grazing areas, so large swaths are prone to erosion. Use of agricultural technologies is
extremely limited, with the brunt of production being entirely dependent upon rainfall.
Less than 1 percent of arable land is irrigated; the cost of irrigation is prohibitive
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 18). Because of the weather dependency of
food crops, yields of roots, tubers, and vegetables widely oscillate between scarcity and
surplus. Much of the arable land has minimal organic content and is not well-suited for
farming (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 12). Poor infrastructure, lack of credit,
minimal access to technology, and limited energy availability further hamper incentives
to participate in the agricultural sector and improve existing practices, particularly in the
realm of environmental and economic sustainability.
The Northern Region, which is semiarid, has the greatest need for irrigation.
However, these lands are comprised of voltaic sandstone, which has low fertility and
water capacity, limiting agricultural potential (Pleasant Valley Conservancy 2009: 1).
Because there is limited ground water capacity, dams would be the primary means of
irrigation infrastructure (Kuyini 2005: 1). The Kpong Irrigation Project (which was
completed in December 2003), which distributes water from the Kpong Dam through
canals, has caused water tables to rise (MASDAR 2009). This, along with increased
agricultural activity, has increased erosion, soil salinity, and human exposure to
agrochemicals (African Development Fund 2005). However, the Agricultural
Development Bank has cut funding, due to poor governmental planning (Ghanaian
Chronicle 2001).
However, officials of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) believe
irrigation should be increased, as there exists a “well-endowed network of water bodies

47

which can be tapped for irrigation” (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 21). This is
the same extractive and destructive mentality that has harmed the forestry sector.
Agriculture should not be dependent upon irrigation, and lack of it does not permanently
damage the soil, unlike fertilizers, which improve soil quality, increase sustainability, and
augment crop yields.
Ghanaian agriculture is inefficient, due to limited access to inputs (because of
limitations in both credit and affordability), land property-owning systems that hamper
ability to invest, poor soil conditions, erratic precipitation, disease, pests, and poor breeds
(of both plants and livestock). Lack of knowledge regarding “post-harvest management”,
especially of perishable produce has caused extensive post-harvest losses of up to 50
percent of yields. Traditional processing methods are most commonly used but tend to
have low yields of poorer quality (but the exact opposite is true of palm oil).
Poor infrastructure increases the costs of agricultural inputs like fertilizer. And in
spite of its comparative advantage in horticultural crops, such as pineapple, Ghana is less
competitive to Latin American, East Asian, and neighboring countries. This has been
primarily attributed to poor infrastructure, high capital costs, lack of irrigation, poor
quality control, and insufficient management of logistics.
Gender inequality problems are largely intertwined with agricultural practices, in
regard to both human rights and overall economic efficiency considerations. Lack of
feeder roads between farms and villages require manual transportation of produce, and
this is predominantly the women’s duty. Women are also responsible for the majority of
household responsibilities, marketing, and agricultural work, culminating in a “triple
workload”. Even women whose livelihoods are connected with families conduct a large
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share of agricultural work. Men tend to migrate to the cities for work and send home
money to support their families, while the women conduct all of the household
responsibilities and agricultural work. In addition, female access to land and capital is
limited because of “cultural and institutional factors”; for example, lack of legal
ownership over tangible assets translates into incapacity to possess collateral for
obtaining credit. Furthermore, extension services largely ignore women, as the extension
agents do not consider them legitimate farmers. Therefore, a large number of households
are completely neglected by extension services, and fewer than 20 percent of extension
services reach women. These extension services are vital, as they also play a key role in
improving food safety.
Due to low literacy among farmers, dissemination of information is hampered. A
disproportionately higher prevalence of poverty within the agricultural sector also limits
new practice adoption, as lack of economic viability limits purchasing power and
increases risk-aversion. Approximately 80 percent of Ghana’s total agricultural output is
produced by subsistence farms that use minimal forms of technology, and 90 percent of
agricultural holdings are less than two hectares. Many agricultural producers do not
recognize the relationship between the health of the environment and agricultural
productivity.
Although modern Ghana as a whole has enjoyed food security, there are segments
of the population that lack this in all regions: “for most households, hunger is frequently
associated with poor harvests resulting from environmental degradation, poor weather,
natural disasters, or conflict. Almost all families supplement their food requirements
with significant amounts of purchased staple crops”. Malnutrition is most problematic

49

for children, adolescents and pregnant women, due to insufficient levels of food intake
and/or diets lacking proper levels of nutrients. Malnutrition contributes to 40 percent of
childhood mortality. Seven percent of children are “wasted” due to acute malnutrition,
down two percent from 1998. There are 11 times more underweight children than in a
typical well-nourished population.
Limited collateral vastly diminishes credit, due to minimal value assets and lack
of official ownership by women (whose impact on the sector is enormous) and other
economically disadvantaged actors. Additionally, interest rates are high, and financiers
view agriculture as a risky sector. The ADB, which primarily loans to large traders,
farmers, and processing units, provided but 28 percent of the total demand for credit in
the agricultural sector in 2006.
Many policies are still based upon the pre-independence structure. Many policies
are based upon repeated mistakes, some upon successful endeavors, and a few are
experiments. Because governmental interventions in the cocoa subsector, as in providing
vital agricultural inputs, have been successful in reducing poverty within that arena, these
form the basis for initiatives of the second Food and Agricultural Sector Development
Policy.

Colonial Policy
Before Ghana became independent from Britain, agricultural policy created by the
colonial rule bolstered food and raw material production for the Empire’s benefit. The
Gold Coast was expected to provide Europe with raw inputs to be processed abroad. A
poll tax law passed in the early 1900s further encouraged most sustenance farmers to
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produce cash crops, especially cocoa (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25). Several governmental
programs were implemented to promote cash crop production (in particular, oil palm and
cocoa) and agricultural development in general, such as the 1919 Ten-Year Development
Plan. To increase efficiency within the agricultural sector, the colonial government
developed a road and railway infrastructure, particularly in the South (AsumingBrempong 2003). Unlike many of its neighbors, Ghana fortunately did not face “largescale land alienation and harsh labour codes” (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25). Plantations
were also not as common in Ghana, due to a belief of increased resiliency in small-scale
agricultural operations (World Rainforest Movement 2010).
However, colonial influences discouraged “subsistence economic activities” in
the Gold Coast (Ghana) so that the colony would be profitable to Britain in exporting to it
minerals, cash crops, and timber. “Extractive industries” faced low taxation, and
agricultural products grown by the rural poor were sold below their true value. Most of
the profits were retained by European companies, and much of what remained in the
Gold Coast paid the colonial administration (Forest Watch Ghana 2006: 19).
It was not until 1946 that another 10-Year Development Plan was penned for the
then Gold Coast (Asuming-Brempong 2003). A few similar plans were implemented
until the Nkrumah administration modeled a new plan based on Eastern European
countries following independence.

Cocoa
Poorly designed policies have had detrimental effects on Ghana’s single-most
important industry, cocoa. Over-reaching policies have greatly hampered cocoa

51

production. It is also epitomizes Ghana’s sacrifice of food crops for export crops. The
majority of the Ghanaian government’s funding was solely derived from cocoa, the
nation’s bumper crop (Ascher 1999: 1-279). The repercussions of heavy taxation on the
most economically successful industry in Ghana were widespread. However, there have
been a few successful policies, such as governmental provision (and subsidization) of
agricultural inputs, such as pest and disease protection for the crops.
The Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing Board, also known as COCOBOD, was
officially established in 1947 (COCOBOD 2010). Though COCOBOD’s ostensible
purpose was to improve cocoa production infrastructure, rehabilitate farms, improve
harbor infrastructure, conduct research, and prevent crop disease, it soon became highly
politicized by the dominant Convention People’s Party (CPP) in the 1950s. All nongovernmental cocoa purchasing companies were banned, and a state agency—the United
Ghana Farmers’ Council Cooperatives, or UGFCC—was created to exercise complete
control over cocoa cooperatives. The UGFCC “had both a political and an economic
monopoly”. Since the UGFCC and state-run Cocoa Board were extremely powerful and
implemented a variety of activities (such as taxation, purchasing cocoa, making loans,
running cocoa cooperatives, providing technical assistance and crop disease treatment,
operating health centers, providing scholarships, and supporting the University College),
there was no accountability in fund allocations to the “producing areas” (Ascher 1999: 1279). COCOBOD’s internal marketing monopoly also prevents marketing efficiency via
competing buyers that would improve producer prices.
A large gap between cocoa export and farmgate prices developed as revenues
were allocated to general governmental funds; “public cocoa income” comprised 60
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percent of export sales in 1953-4. In addition, Cocoa Board reserves were made
available for loans and grants unrelated to cocoa production and/or marketing. A 1954
ordinance allocated 40 percent of the funds to finance the national development plan, 40
percent to fund large-scale projects beyond the national development plan’s scope, and
20 percent was given to the central treasury (Ascher 1999: 1-279).
Cocoa taxation was also structured to encourage urban development and
discourage agriculture, though cocoa production was and remains the staple of Ghana’s
economy. Unity within the CPP, which was pro-industry, enabled this gross exploitation
of the cocoa industry. “Ghana’s most precious export commodity” was likely put at such
risk because of low expected political and other retaliation from the cocoa industry,
desire to industrialize the economy, and ease of obtaining cocoa surpluses. Taxing
agriculture for “self-reliance” led to “agricultural decline and inefficient industry”
(Ascher 1999: 1-279).
Taxation was so high that between 1975 and 1985, producers often received less
than ten percent of the world market price. Coupled with plummeting world prices,
cocoa production drastically declined. The combination of decreased production of
Ghana’s single greatest source of revenue with high inflation culminated an economic
crisis in the 1980s (Ascher 1999: 1-279). And though cocoa comprised 14 percent of
national GDP in 1970, this figure declined to 3.5 percent in 1980 and further to 2.6
percent in 1982 (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
Fortunately for cocoa producers, as a condition for IMF and World Bank funds,
the government agreed (in part with other reforms) to raise cocoa producer prices in 1983
(Ascher 1999: 1-279). Cocoa output eventually increased, aided by devaluation of the
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Cedi. Government programs that “mass spray cocoa farms” to protect the crops from
pests and disease and higher nominal producer prices have also augmented production
(Asuming-Brempong 2003). However, only industrial tree crops (like cocoa, coffee, and
oil palm) were assisted by the government (US Library of Congress 2011).
The 1988-9 Cocoa Rehabilitation Project (CRP) was a result of the 1983 ERP,
which pushed stabilization and structural reform. The CRP was the first cocoa project in
Ghana to be funded by the Agricultural Development Bank. Stated objectives of the CRP
were: increased cocoa production, augmenting foreign exchange earnings from cocoa
exportation, and reduced rural poverty. The project took ten years to implement instead
of the intended five. Due to an improved producer price, hybrid seed availability, and
governmental disease/pest control, the CRP was successful in increasing cocoa
production (African Development Bank 2002).
Eventually, governmental control of cocoa production in general decreased
drastically. The Ghana National Association of Farmers and Fishermen was established
in 1991, in place of the Ghana Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives. Funding from
the farmers was expected to run this cooperative in place of governmental sponsorship.
The lack of financial support from the government put farmers in a hard position (U.S.
Library of Congress 2011).
In addition, the Cocoa Marketing Board’s control over pricing and marketing
eventually declined (U.S. Library of Congress 2011). Two new buyers (Universal Crop
Production Limited and Cashew and Spices Products) were licensed to buy cocoa in 1992
(in addition to the Produce Buying Company, which is one of COCOBOD’s
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subsidiaries). Even more cocoa buying agencies have been licensed recently (AsumingBrempong 2003).
Cocoa prices have increased by about three times since 2001. The second Food
and Agriculture Sector Development Plan aims to increase the amount locally-processed
cocoa from 20 percent in 2002 to 40-50 percent in 2007. This is incredibly optimistic,
and as seen by the forestry sector, extreme optimism may not be the best approach.
Sometimes processing does not actually increase profits, due to high levels of waste.

Post-Independence
Socialism
The post-independence government, led by Kwame Nkrumah, was heavily
influenced by Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It created 1,089 state and
cooperative farms from 1961 until it was overthrown in 1966. The Agricultural
Development Corporation and State Farm Workers Brigade and Farmers' Co-operative
were established in 1963 to modernize and increase the national scale of agricultural
endeavors (Asuming-Brempong 2003). However, the performance under this socialist
system was poor.
Price controls were introduced with “quantitative import restrictions” that began
in 1962. The government’s aim was to decrease inflation and protect the consumer,
preventing both importers and domestic manufacturers from “earning monopoly rents”.
Items included imported consumer goods and domestically produced good with “high
import content”. The price controls, however, did not extend to most local food products
(Killick 1973: 405-26). Maximum prices were set for manufactured goods and minimum
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prices for “major agricultural commodities” such as cocoa, corn and rice (AsumingBrempong 2003).
However, price controls are only effective when conditions enable there to be
“large monopoly profits”. Corruption also prevented improved enforcement that would
have made the price controls more effective. Hence, the controls were mostly ignored,
especially in urban markets and rural areas as a whole. Only urban shops, which have
predominantly elite clientele, abided by this policy. Hence, the inequalities in living
standards were only broadened, as the elite reaped the benefits of discounted goods
(Killick 1973: 405-26). The price controls only exacerbated the existing problems of
scarcity and inflation, as the amount of imports was drastically limited and governmental
spending increased (Meier and Steel 1989).
State-run large-scaled operations, such as State Farms and the Food-Production
Corporation “have been notoriously inefficient” (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25). These farms
were most dominant for five years during the 1960s. Though the governments supported
large-scale farms since the 1950s, state farms only began to be majorly implemented in
1962, following a recent plummet in world cocoa prices and foreign exchange shortfalls
that reduced imports in raw materials and food (Miracle and Seidman 1968: 3-50).
The State Farms Corporation (SFC) began operations in June of 1962 (though it
was not officially established until the following January). Its purpose was to expand
agricultural production, at which the government felt that the traditional sector was
failing (Miracle and Seidman 1968: 3-50).
The 1963-4 Seven-Year Development Plan aimed to increase basic food crop
production, expand crops into “uncultivated” areas (to put “idle land resources…to
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productive use”), and boost export crop and meat production. In eagerness to dominate
the land and produce, many valuable resources were wasted. Though these data vary
widely, of Ghana’s approximate million acres of agricultural lands, it has been estimated
that state farms held roughly 250,000 acres, 203,000 of which were cleared, with only
99,000 cultivated (1965) (Miracle and Seidman 1968: 3-50).
Some organizations, such as the state-run Workers’ Brigade (which contained
many unemployed citizens who were paid to work the farms), worked in concert with
state farm productions; the Brigade grew roughly 13 percent of State Farms’ crops.
However, many Brigade workers and camps were “fictitious”, with its supervisors
pocketing the money (Miracle and Seidman 1968: 3-50).
In 1967, the SFC created several processing mills. However, it lacked adequate
staffing, in regards to both competency and number of employees. Resources were set
aside for the workers to live on the farms, but the vast majority chose to remain in their
villages. Use of mechanized equipment was limited, due to inadequate training and risk
of erosion (with the clearing of large swaths of land). Regardless of the inefficiencies,
the production targets were very optimistic, and during the State Farms’ lives, there was
always a great disparity between these and the actual results. Due to large expenditures,
such as for unused machinery and supplies to encourage living on the farms, coupled
with small returns, the SFC posted of a loss of approximately $4 million in 1964, $7 in
1965, and $9 million in 1966 (Miracle and Seidman 1968: 3-50).
The 1964 Sever-Year Plan focused on industrialization, with the ambitious goal of
an 83 percent increase in industrial output by 1970.

Import substitution was another

focus of the policy, as was the creation of a processing industry for raw agricultural and
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mining products. The plan’s aim was to focus on a few commodities and apply more
advanced forms of agricultural and technical knowledge because of that specialization.
The commodities were chosen based on nutritional benefits (i.e. cereals and fish) and/or
the ability to solve Ghana's trade deficit (i.e. sugar and cocoa). Extension services by the
government were used to augment agricultural development (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
This socialist approach to administration diverged from the colonial
administrative strategy. State enterprises were established to support economic
development and industrialization. Various other policies were implemented for the
same reason, including internal price controls, establishing a minimum wage, controlling
the interest rate, over-valuing the exchange rate, and providing free importation of capital
equipment to promote industry and use of technology. The creation of farming
cooperatives was encouraged, as this was thought to increase access to machinery and
modern agricultural techniques. The Seven Year Development Plan was scrapped just
two years later with the 1966 coup, and the military and civilian governments that
followed created their own 2-Year and 1-Year Development Plans (Asuming-Brempong
2003).

Economic liberalization
Because Ghana’s economy has been highly dependent upon agriculture, most
regimes were empowered or overthrown because of their agricultural platforms.
Discontent related to rising food prices and lack of imported raw materials that limited
both agricultural and industrial operations were major reasons for Nkrumah’s upset
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(Miracle and Seidman 1968: 3-50). The plans following the 1966 coup promoted liberal
economic policies and development of the private sector (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
The National Liberation Council government that claimed control in 1966 focused
on economic stabilization by pushing a “market-oriented” economy. “Stringent
stabilization measures” were taken by minimizing gross national expenditure, liberalizing
trade, devaluing the Cedi (most major in 1971), and cutting public capital expenditures.
Several state-owned companies were sold to the private sector, and others were reorganized under the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation, starting in 1968. Import
licensing and ceilings were cut, and export subsidies for crops other than cocoa were
initiated (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
The overly optimistic import substitution strategy of the 1960s was funded by
increasing the money supply, although a major budget deficit already existed. The
capitalist military and following civilian governments that controlled Ghana after
Nkrumah’s 1966 overthrow completely abandoned this, but import tariffs were low and
the balance of payments problem remained. To solve this problem, the Cedi was
devalued to increase exports. In addition, single commodity development boards were
established to aid subsistence farming efforts (Asuming-Brempong 2003).

Re-introduction of restrictive polices
The Agricultural Development Bank was established in 1968 to provide credit for
funding agricultural improvements. The government also improved the infrastructure in
rural areas to encourage rural inhabitance. However, the next government and others
during the political turmoil of the 1970s completely reversed economic policy again,
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overvalued the Cedi, and re-implemented price controls. This caused per capita income to
plummet by 40 percent. Agricultural production decreased from the 1960s until the
Economic Reform Policy/Structural Adjustment Program (ERP/SAP) of 1983 was
adopted (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
The decline was due in part to poor economic policies and weather conditions.
Commodity prices greatly dropped during the late 1960s, and infrastructure and
governmental services in general have been inadequate since. This problem is compacted
by limited access to agricultural inputs, which have not been subsidized since the 1983
ERP. Consequently, the “food self-sufficiency ratio” fell from 83 percent between 1961
and 1966 to 71 percent in the period 1978-80; food imports quadrupled during the 197282 period. Drought caused food shortages and decreased export crop production (U.S.
Library of Congress 2011).
Because the desired results from the import restrictions and price controls did not
come to fruition, just before the 1972 military coup, the government drastically reduced
the number of products previously included in the controls. However, the new military
government re-expanded the number of items subject to import restrictions (Killick 1973:
405-26).
Food shortages sparked the overthrow of the democratic government in 1972 by a
military regime that created and implemented the Operation Feed Yourself (OFY) policy
that same year. Although food production was actually declining, OFY called for
“national self-reliance based on increased food production”. The agricultural growth rate
was only 2.6 percent between 1969 and 1972, but the targeted growth rate under the
policy (to begin in 1973) was unrealistically set at six percent (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25).
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Adverse weather conditions widened the disparity between the amount that the farmers
were able to produce and that which the government had expected (Asuming-Brempong
2003). A food shortage obviously resulted and the price of food subsequently
skyrocketed (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25). These, joined with plummeting mining and
timber operations, lead to the economy’s drastic decline between 1972 and 1982. The
economy’s failure and high previously-accumulated deficits prompted the government to
borrow large sums of money. The government then expanded the money supply, which
caused inflation to soar from nine percent in 1970 to 123 percent in 1983 (AsumingBrempong 2003).
In a desperate attempt to increase the supply of food, Operation Feed Yourself
encouraged the Ministry of Agriculture, state-run agricultural corporations and
agricultural boards, schools, colleges, prisons, the armed forces, private corporations and
individual citizens to engage in agricultural production. The Ministry of Agriculture also
pushed production of the most efficient crops on a regional basis (Girdner et al 1980: 1425).
However, farmers were only granted Agricultural Development Bank loans if
land ownership was documented properly. This practice continues. Since most land is
communally owned, with land granted by the local chief, this policy is problematic for a
typical small-scale farmer. It is difficult to use undocumented communal lands as
mortgage collateral. In addition, land registration for loans must also be done in Accra;
due to transportation limitations, this is not feasible for many communities. The
administrative process itself is flawed as well; “delays and mix-ups” are common. If a
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farmer somehow is able to successfully complete the application process, s/he typically
does not actually receive the loan until one to two years later (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25).
Expansion of state-run agricultural activities was pushed once more via OFY.
However, repayment of debts (to the Agricultural Development Bank, founded in 1965)
by State Farms and the Food Production Corporation continued to be poor, and funds
were not used as intended; they were often spent on “payment of old debts, personal
allowances, salaries, and the acquisition of capital items not having any immediate
bearing on production”. The government did not publicize annual yields information,
and food shortages were common, evidencing the large-scaled operations failures
(Girdner et al 1980: 14-25).
The recurring theme of limited cooperation among state agencies was fortunate in
this instance. The wasteful State Farms operations died out, in part due to the
Agricultural Development Bank discontinuing OFY corporation funds as of 1975. But
failing large enterprises continued to receive the majority of governmental aid while
neglect of small farming operations remained (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25).
The ADB is notorious for holding overly stringent standards for loans to farmers.
This is partly due to the astronomical losses to the Bank from State Farms. The ADB
was forced to take this measure to protect itself from collapsing, but the lack of funding
available to sustenance operations impedes agricultural efficiency. Since the government
had promised financial aid, difficulty in receiving loans diminished faith in the
government. In addition, the Extension Service and similar organizations that were given
the responsibility of implementing OFY did not act in a manner that impacted the food
producers (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25).
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A 1980 article by the IPC Business Press stated: “until quite recently, few
attempts at eradicating the problems inherent to a mono-crop economy had been made by
modern Ghanaian governments”. In addition to extensive governmental funding, export
crop producers (predominantly large-scale cocoa farmers) have received basically all
benefits of agricultural research, such as improved seeds, pest control, and improved
production techniques (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25).
In 1977, plantations were created with joint ownership between the government
and private sector (both domestic and foreign). Two of the three major oil palm
plantations created had joint private and governmental ownership, and the third (GOPDC,
which was divested in 1995) was owned by the state but given foreign assistance (World
Rainforest Movement 2010). Following the 1981 coup, many similar operations
proliferated due to governmental support.
The regime that assumed power in December of 1981 immediately reduced the
amount at which the Cedi was devalued from 78.2 percent to 25 percent. The
government played an even stronger role in agriculture, as was apparent with the
reintroduction of import licensing (which are non-tariff trade barriers), price controls, and
the import substitution strategy. Consequently, engagement in black market activities
soared. Inefficiency, overstaffing, fraudulent allocation of public funds, and poor
accounting practices by the public sector were also problematic. Falling world cocoa
prices and once again, adverse weather conditions placed additional strain on the national
economy (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
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Crisis
By 1983, the economic decline was unrivalled (Asuming-Brempong 2003). Due
to scarcity, locally produced foods in 1980 were more expensive than imported
equivalents. The consumer index, based upon year 1963, reached 226.7 (and 259.4 for
the local food index) in 1972, but in 1977 was a whopping 1,729.2 (2,677.8 for the local
food index) (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25). Food self-sufficiency was 83 percent between
1964 and 1966 but only 60 percent in 1982, although the economy was impaired mostly
due to failed attempts to reduce dependence. The deficit soared as total public
expenditure outpaced government revenue by 65 percent (Asuming-Brempong 2003).

Gradually returning to economic liberalization
Though subsidization of agricultural inputs (such as fertilizer and other
agrochemicals) created “bottlenecks” in their availability, the gradual removal of those
subsidies (via the ERP and SAP)—though meant to improve efficiency—may have been
more detrimental. The costs of these inputs became entirely prohibitive, which has led to
soil depletion and subsequent diminished agricultural productivity. However,
agricultural investments were prioritized, with loans and grants as the primary means for
such (U.S. Library of Congress 2011). In addition, the Cedi’s exchange rate was
realigned (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
Reforms in 1983 limited governmental involvement in production, distribution,
and marketing, both of inputs and products (Khor 2006). Guaranteed prices for corn and
rice were cut, and imports were then allowed to compete with domestically produced
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items. However, cocoa continued to have a guaranteed price, since it is so vital to
Ghana’s economy (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
But as with OFY, the policy failed; all major foods (except yams) experienced
higher price instability during the post-liberalization era than before the so-called reforms
(Asuming-Brempong 2003). In addition, subsidy removal of agricultural inputs hindered
the Ghanaian farmers’ capabilities to compete with cheaper imports supported by other
governments’ subsidies on inputs. Hence, several industries failed, such as rice, poultry,
oil palm, and cotton production.
Basically all palm oil is hand-processed in villages by women. The only inputs
are water, a large pestle, fire, and human labor. The remaining palm nuts and fibers are
re-used, so this is a very efficient method. In addition, hand-produced palm oil is
strongly preferred by consumers, due to its higher quality. However, industrial oil palm
production is being promoted by the government now, mostly due to its use as a biofuel
(World Rainforest Movement 2010).
Agricultural production declined until the Economic Recovery Programme
(ERP)/Social Adjustment Programme (SAP) of 1983 was adopted (Asuming-Brempong
2003). The ERP was provided IMF and World Bank assistance, in order to reduce
Ghana’s debts and improve trade. However, the World Bank’s assistance depended upon
developing the private sector (U.S. Library of Congress 2011).
The ERP’s focus was on the export sector, not food production (U.S. Library of
Congress 2011). The ERP and SAP liberalized importation. It also improved foreign
exchange rates, improved infrastructure, privatized state-owned enterprises, and
liberalized trade. The policy’s stated goals were: “restoring economic productivity at
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minimum cost to the government”, lowering inflation (through trade, fiscal and monetary
policies), improving foreign exchange rates, liberalizing trade, restructuring the economy
(through privatization of state-owned enterprises), enhancing infrastructure to boost
commerce, and increasing availability of necessary goods (Library of Congress 2011).
The ERP/SAP aimed to deregulate “both the input and output markets” (AsumingBrempong 2003).
The policy was implemented in three phases. During the first, governmental
expenditures was reduced in order to encourage private production. This cut the deficit
from 6.3 percent of GDP in 1982 to 0.1 percent in 1986, even though large infrastructure
improvements took place in 1986. The government sold assets, increased privatization,
and implemented exchange reforms to devaluate the cedi during the second phase (19879). Foreign exchange bureaus were introduced in 1988, cutting the “hard-currency black
market”. The final phase involved more monetary reforms and reduced corporate taxes
(Library of Congress 2011). However, monetary policies flipped back and forth between
being restrictive and liberal between 1985 and 1995 (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
The 1987-90 Agricultural Services Rehabilitation Project (ASRP) had similar
objectives. The policy aimed to strengthen and improve the services of the Ministry of
Food and Agriculture and reform existing practices to privatize production and marketing
of various agricultural inputs (such as veterinary drugs and fertilizer) (AsumingBrempong 2003).
The annual agricultural growth rate decreased from 3.57 percent during the 1980s
to 1.97 percent during the 1990s (Asuming-Brempong 2003). Also due to the ERP (and
its subsequent import liberalization and lack of available credit), many governmental
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workers became unemployed (aka “retrenched”); 18,000 workers were “retrenched” from
the state enterprises and civil service and another 40,000 by the Ghana Cocoa Board.
Budget devoted to agriculture plummeted from ten percent in 1983 to 3.5 percent in
1988. PAMSCAD was created to mitigate for the negative social consequences of the
ERP (and related economic reforms), and its focus was aid to the poorest citizens, who
were primarily small-scale miners and artisans (U.S. Library of Congress 2011).

Improving upon the ERP/SAP
Though the economic policy reforms greatly contributed to environmental
degradation, PAMSCAD did not address this. The ERP greatly increased incentives to
produce export crops like cocoa, but the costs of improved agricultural technologies
drastically increased. Therefore, these were not commonly used, leading to reduced
overall agricultural productivity. Hence, more land became cultivated and degraded,
worsening deforestation (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
The Programme of Actions to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment, or
PAMSCAD (1988), facilitated “donor-funded community initiated development
projects”, supported education, increased employment, and provided assistance to
retrenched civil servants and other workers. PAMSCAD was successful in improving
the livelihoods of those who were harmed by the ERP/SAP. The Programme was
strongly supported by donors. Water and sanitation also greatly improved, and this
positively impacted agricultural productivity. However, poverty worsened during the
mid-late 1980s, and many individuals moved from urban to rural areas (AsumingBrempong 2003).
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The Financial Sector Adjustment Programme (FINSAP) was created in 1988 with
financial assistance from the IMF and the World Bank. This was created to address
“structural and institutional weaknesses of the financial sector” in order to increase the
Structural Adjustment Program’s effectiveness. Deficits were cut, and the money supply
was controlled more stringently. The Cedi’s exchange rate was converted from a flexible
to a fixed rate. Rural banks were restructured by the Bank of Ghana, through the 1989-92
Rural Finance Project (which was also World Bank funded). This was to mitigate the
agricultural productivity decline of the 1970s-80s, by enhancing local capacity to create
and implement rural finance policy (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
Prior to these reforms, credit was granted to “priority sectors” (such as the
agricultural sector). Because of this, loans to agricultural endeavors were required to
comprise at least 20 percent of those allocated by banks. The Central Bank fixed interest
rates on loans to agriculture at least two to three percent below rates to other sectors.
However, these credit ceilings were removed by FINSAP. Many claim that FINSAP has
increased credit mobilization and efficiency in credit allocation. However, credit to
“priority areas” has been decreasing. Only 15.9 percent of total loans in 1990—
considerably lower than the mandated 20 percent—were allocated to agriculture by
commercial and secondary banks, and this further declined to 5.7 percent in 1995
(Asuming-Brempong 2003).
Agricultural real output even declined in 1990 and 1992; between 1989 and 1992,
the agricultural growth rate was the lowest in recent years, at 2.6 percent, with shrinks of
two percent and 0.6 percent in years 1990 and 1992. However, the services sector grew
unprecedentedly. Lending rates have been high (almost 50 percent annually in the 1990s)
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and available credit low. Agriculture has low rates of return; financial institutions instead
invested in treasury bills and other assets that bear high interest rates. Agriculture is rainfed and therefore depends entirely upon weather conditions, so yields are uncertain
(Asuming-Brempong 2003).
Subsidies for agricultural inputs were completely removed by 1991. The
agricultural sector also took a hit from the excess demand for foreign exchange, which
devalued the Cedi; agricultural inputs from abroad became unaffordable. Because the
increases in the prices of improved agricultural technologies therefore outpaced prices of
agriculture output, they were (and are) not implemented. Hence, agricultural productivity
has remained low; increased levels of production have only occurred because more land
was exploited. Incentive to produce agricultural outputs that are not exported was
decreased: because other countries subsidize inputs, domestic producers are unable to
compete, regardless of the discount benefit from the undervalued Cedi. In addition, postharvest losses are high from limited storage and processing capability (AsumingBrempong 2003).
The 1991 National Feeder Roads Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project was
created to facilitate economic development in rural areas. By improving feeder roads,
transportation costs decrease and ease of agricultural endeavors is improved. The fouryear project includes a contracted feeder road rehabilitation and maintenance program, a
“sustainable management system”, institutional support (to improve planning and
supervision), and support in decentralizing the Department of Feeder Roads (World Bank
1999).
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Policies to reverse the decline in agriculture
The PNDC party focused on augmenting local food production during the early
1990s. The Medium Term Agricultural Development Program (1991-2000) was
formulated to “attain food self-sufficiency and security by the year 2000” (U.S. Library
of Congress 2011). The MTADP guided the Ministry of Food and Agriculture during the
1990s. The World Bank funded much of this, again on the condition of privatized
agricultural marketing and freer market pricing. Input supplies were liberalized in order
to increase supply reliability, as competition due to lower prices diminished what was
available (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
MTADP objectives were to be achieved via “market-led growth in agriculture”;
governmental output and input intervention declined, but the state increased
infrastructure (as through feeder road establishment and repairs), irrigation, crop disease
research and extension services. As with most other policies, industrial production and
improved balance of payments were stressed (Zimmerman et al 2009). Because of World
Bank suggestions, the government continued to depend upon the private sector to
implement these measures; unfortunately, this put subsistence agricultural endeavors at a
gross disadvantage (U.S. Library of Congress 2011). With limited state assistance, vital
services (such as fertilizer application and pest control) are lacking.
MTADP programs aimed to increase annual growth in agricultural GDP to four
percent. MTADP projects include the Agricultural Diversification Project (1991-9),
National Agricultural Research Project (1991-9), Land Conservation and Smallholder
Rehabilitation Project (1991-7), National Agricultural Extension Project (1992-2000),
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Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (1992-9), and Agricultural Sector Investment
Project (1994-2000) (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
The Agricultural Diversification Project was created with the intention of
increasing production of non-cocoa tree crops, such as oil palm, coffee, and rubber, and
horticultural crops (i.e. pineapple) for exportation and import substitution so that Ghana
will be less dependent upon cocoa. The ADP provides “training and technical support” to
farmers and institutions that produce the “target crops” (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
The National Agricultural Research Project (NARP) attempted to develop and
reform research management, human resources, research facilities, library/information
systems, and sustainability of financial resources. The government and a few other
donors financially support Ghanaian agricultural research, but the funding is unreliable.
NARP called for all contributions to be routed through the National Agricultural
Research Committee, though other options, like a donation-fed research development
fund, were “explored” (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
The Land Conservation and Smallholder Rehabilitation Project encouraged retired
public and civil sector employees to farm. To do so, credit and training was provided
(Asuming-Brempong 2003).
The number of agricultural extension agents was increased from one agent per
1,504 farmers in 1991 to one per 780 in 2000 due to the National Agricultural Extension
Project (Asuming-Brempong 2003). Extension agents, among other things, apply
research knowledge and instruct famers about improved agricultural technology and
practices (Bokor 2005). It is worth noting that the number of extension agents has
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dwindled to one per 3,000 and that unreliable transportation decreases the agents’
efficiency (Ghana News Agency 2007).
The Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit supported agricultural sector reforms
and poverty alleviation. ASAC requested creation of poverty reduction programs from
the government in 1992-93 (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
The Agricultural Sector Investment Project aimed to increase the allocation of
technical and financial resources towards rural development. This also supported
agricultural processing, market infrastructure, storage capacity expansion, maintenance of
feeder roads, and provision of water in rural areas (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
The Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Development Strategy (AAGDS) of
1996 followed the MTADP to promote agricultural growth. Proposed initiatives
included: increased marketing access for certain products, access to financial services and
technological advancements for sustainable production, infrastructure, and human
resource and institutional capacity (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
The 1996 civilian government launched the VISION 2020 Framework (AsumingBrempong 2003). The Framework was introduced in 1996 with the objective of
transforming Ghana into a middle income state by year 2020 (Government of Ghana
1995). Its focus was on agriculture and forestry to provide these improvements, with
education cited as the biggest impediment to achieving the VISION 2020 goals (Oteng
1999). VISION 2020 “is not a plan but a planning framework to provide guidance to
planning agencies to prepare their own development plans”. This defers the power to the
agencies. The actual plans were to be created and implemented by “Ministries, Sectoral
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Agencies, and District Assemblies”; these are the “Planning Authorities” (Government of
Ghana 1995).
VISION 2020 set the goal of an annual growth rate of agricultural output at four
percent (1996) by year 2000, compared to an actual rate of 1.8 percent prior. As with
other failed policies, VISION 2020 was overly ambitious. Therefore, it only lasted for
five years (instead of 24). In spite of this, the plan’s first five-year rolling plan (5YRP)
included concrete and useful steps, such as increasing all farm inputs, improving
infrastructure, encouraging private enterprise (with a plan to privatize all state-owned
agricultural enterprises by 2000), and diversifying crop production (Government of
Ghana 1995). It included initiatives to decrease deforestation and drought as well
(Iddrisu and Telly 1999). The 5YRP is intended to be a “reference document that
informs the entire country as well as the international community of the enabling
environment to be provided by Ghana government (sic) in support of private investment”.
It is also used to inform NGOs of broad social and economic intentions (Government of
Ghana 1995). Because Ghana is very “aid-dependent” (Jeffrey 2009), it is necessary to
inform the international community in order to fund these initiatives.
In 2001, VISION 2020 was declared “dormant” and “dead” by the government
in official statements made by the Minister of Economic Planning and Regional
Cooperation and the Minister of Finance (Ghana News Agency 2001), (Accra Mail
2001). During its short life, the program did not receive adequate funding (Ghana News
Agency 2001). This has been attributed to political reasons; the year 2000 marked a
majority party switch from the NDC to the NPP (Accra Mail 2001).
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The 1997 Village Infrastructure Project was created to improve rural living
standards. One initiative is improved rural water infrastructure and management, with an
emphasis on water conservation techniques and investments in technologies that would
provide water for human consumption and agricultural use. The Project also aims to
improve feeder roads. Improvement of post-harvest infrastructure was also a priority,
with aims of providing community crop drying (to cut post-harvest losses), storage, and
processing facilities. The Project also intended to increase the roles of District
Assemblies, NGOs, and other community organizations (World Bank 2000).
The Smallholder Credit, Input Supply, and Marketing Project (SCIMP) was
implemented during 1990-9 in the Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, and Volta Regions. This
provided farmers and food traders with short-term loans. SCIMP also helped to create
dams and hand-dug wells (for agricultural and personal household use) and farm access
roads through financial support to the Department of Feeder Roads (Asuming-Brempong
2003).
Ghana has been struggling intermittently with national deficits (though they
totaled over 200 million USD in the early 1990s) in recent years. Agriculture helps with
Ghana’s balance of payments through commodity exports and by providing import
substitutions. Agriculture accounted for 43.9 percent of export earnings in 1999, but this
figure rapidly declined to 33.9 percent in 2001. The sector is incapable of producing
adequate amounts of those commodities that the country has a competitive advantage in
providing (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
The Presidential Special Initiative on Cassava-Starch (PSI) was implemented in
2001 as an attempt to diversify the economy. The PSI aims to increase jobs and foreign
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exchange earnings. In addition to its use as Ghana’s main starch, cassava has many
industrial applications. Approximately 75 percent of farmers already grow cassava, an
indigenous staple crop, to some extent. Therefore, knowledge of how to grow it is
already widespread. In addition, it grows well in “suboptimal conditions”, which would
enable it to be grown in “marginal land” and the challenging climatic conditions of the
north. Hence, there is great potential to expand cassava production. The PSI also aimed
to establish cassava processing plants (to be funded by private investors) that would serve
as models to other starch processing operations (Andoh 2009: 88-93).
The Agricultural Services Sub-sector Investment Project (AgSSIP) of 2002
combined the aims of the Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Development Strategy,
Food and Agricultural Sector Development Policy, and Ghana Poverty Reduction
Strategy (Asuming-Brempong 2003). The World Bank provided funding, as AgSSIP’s
objectives were formulated to bolster the agricultural sector and reduce rural poverty
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2006). AgSSIP focused on Farmer Based
Organizations, as this was believed to be a more effective means of disseminating
extension services and increasing access to inputs, markets, and credit (Ministry of Food
and Agriculture 2006).
The peak agricultural growth rate of the 1990s, 5.2 percent, was achieved in 1996.
Though this quickly diminished to 2.1 percent in 2000, it slowly improved in years 2001
and 2002 (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
Production of “non-traditional” (non-cocoa) export crops has been pushed. This
has been successful; these crops are consistently contributing to foreign exchange
earnings, and Ghana’s Northern Region has faced population growth since rice
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production intensified. However, the soil in the Northern Region is poor and it contains
less water there than the rest of Ghana. Unfortunately, Northern Region is also
agriculturally based. Hence, population growth in the Northern Region is a negative
indicator. But while the current population (2003) grows at 2.9 percent annually, which
is higher than the 2.5 percent national average, this has declined from a 1984 annual
population growth rate of 3.4 percent. Starting in 2001, the government attempted selfsufficiency in foods like cereals and “starchy staples” (such as corn, roots, and tubers).
Ghana’s north has a comparative advantage in growing these (Asuming-Brempong
2003).

Biofuels further threaten land security
Efforts to increase production of biomass energy, which was promoted through
the 1996 VISION 2020, have been accelerating recently (Government of Ghana 1995).
However, biofuel production may pose a risk to Ghanaian agriculture/food security.
“Fragile land ownership rights”, which are mostly collective rather than individual, are
threatened. Vulnerabilities in land laws do not prevent multinationals from acquiring
smallholder farmers’ properties with “little or no compensation”. Most biofuel
companies are foreign-owned, some with Ghanaian partners. Land acquisition for food
crop and non-food crop production to suit the needs of biofuel producers has been
“aggressive”, and these fuels will primarily be exported to developed countries (Dogbevi
2001).
Ghana’s northern areas are most vulnerable to land encroachment. Most biofuel
companies are becoming established in the north. There, “land is abundant and cheap”.
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Ghana’s poverty is concentrated there as well; though the north only accounts for 17.2
percent of Ghana’s population, it contains 54 percent of its poor. The potential
consequences of land encroachment in the northern regions are far-reaching; much of the
grains that feed Ghana (which are scarce) are grown in the north (Dogbevi 2001).
Biofuels supporters claim that the plants (especially Jatropha) can grow on
marginal/degraded lands, the use of which would not displace any communities.
However, “what are often presented as ownerless, unused lands are at times the source of
subsistence for the poorest people, and provide them with food, medicine, construction
materials, fuel and other resources, aside from being used normally for pasture”. Because
the land is not very valuable, marginal lands are not clearly defined, which weakens
smallholders’ property rights. Regardless, biofuels companies do not intend to use
marginal lands, since the yields are much lower than from fertile lands. There is no
policy restraining the biofuels industry in particular, which spurs “uncontrolled and
unregulated development of the biofuels sector” (Dogbevi 2001).

The creation of FASDEP I and its successors, FASDEP II and METASIP
The first Food and Agricultural Sector Development Policy (FASDEP I) of 2002
was created with the main objective of modernizing the agricultural sector. It is a holistic
policy based upon the 1996 Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Development Strategy,
one of the policies that spun off from MTADP with the intention of strengthening the
private sector to bolster the economy. Another policy that attempted local level
involvement, Local Government Law (Act 462) required implementation of policies at
the district level, but it was ignored, due to lack of district capacity and inadequate
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funding. Many of its tenets are based upon the first Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy.
A poverty and social impact analysis declared that the policies would not alleviate
poverty as desired due to the inability to modernize poor smallholder agricultural
endeavors. This reflects the lack of necessary infrastructure, adequate marketing, and
availability of credit and technology. In addition, the policy “did not sufficiently reflect
client perspectives”.
The overall goal of FASDEP II—which is intended to be an improved version of
FASDEP I—is “to enhance Ghana’s comparative advantage and translate it into
competitive advantage in producing the needed volumes of commodity and quality on a
timely basis”. FASDEP II (2007) also prioritizes sustainability, scientific advancements,
use of more advanced technologies, and commercialization, based on market-driven
growth. However, fewer commodities are targeted. Most notably, food security is the
main objective rather than self-sufficiency. This is a crucial development; the previous
governments had erroneously been fixated on self-sufficiency in order to achieve food
security (Asuming-Brempong 2003).
The Medium Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan (METASIP) is mostly
based upon FASDEP II. The six shared objectives are: food security, income growth,
increased market competitiveness, sustainable land management (and other aspects of
agricultural production), increased use of improved technology, and more coordination
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: xi).
Local markets are paying relatively higher prices for crops such as oil palm and
corn, which has encouraged farmers to expand non-cocoa agricultural production in
recent years. In addition, increasing cocoa prices have caused cocoa output to skyrocket
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from 159,000 metric tonnes in 1983 to 493,000 in 2000. Fixed prices for all agricultural
outputs except for cocoa were removed. Subsidization of fertilizer, agro-chemicals, and
other inputs was discontinued as well, which drastically reduced use of fertilizer
(Asuming-Brempong 2003).
METASIP has the incredibly optimistic aim of increasing by 50 percent
“marketed output of staple crops by smallholders” by 2015 (Ministry of Food and
Agriculture 2010: 44). To improve market access, the Policy aims to identify successful
leading agricultural firms and industries, educate farmers on demand-driven production,
and lobby businesses to “participate in selected commodity value chains”. As optimistic
is the intention to increase exportation of “non-traditional agricultural commodities” from
small-scale farmers by 2015 (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 45).

Improved economic considerations
The agricultural sector is also considered capable of absorbing a large number of
unemployed workers, due to its labor intensity. MoFA believes staple crops—more so
than export crops—to be capable of rapid growth and reducing poverty. The Agency
further states: “contribution of agriculture to national social viability has been low
because the structural transformation of the sector has been slow”.
The Policy will not use quotas and tariffs to limit importation. MoFA believes
the economy to have recovered from the economic crisis of the 1980s due to “the sector’s
capacity to increase exports, government tax revenue, domestic food supply and to raise
per capita incomes”. However, this rapid recovery is not uniquely inherent to
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agriculture. But unlike prior strategies, FASDEP II is tailored to differing regional needs
and comparative advantages.
Unlike FASDEP I, FASDEP II recognizes the existence of different categories of
farmers (even within the subgroup “smallholders”) and has created policy accordingly.
The Policy focuses on risk-prone subsistence farmers, reducing their vulnerability and
bolstering productivity. FASDEP II also aims to link commercial and smallholder
endeavors “for their mutual benefit”. Although linking commercial and subsistence
farmers is controversial, FASDEP II is the first Ghanaian policy that takes the needs of
small-scale farming operations into account.
Many of FASDEP II’s strategies are based upon the second Ghana Poverty
Reduction Strategy (GPRS II), whose main goal is to elevate Ghana’s economy from a
lower- to a medium-income country, optimally by 2015. Education, agriculture,
increased access to health services and safe water, improved urban housing options, and
macroeconomic policy are key tenets of GPRS II (National Development Planning
Commission 2005).
To increase use and cost-effectiveness of inputs, FASDEP II endeavors to
increase “competitiveness and cost-reduction in input markets”. The strategies to
accomplish this are increasing trade of agricultural inputs (by creating policies to
encourage this), encouraging district input vendors, educating the public on the benefits
of input application, and promoting local production. Those initiatives that decrease cost
will likely be the most effective, since price is the most significant barrier (rather than
awareness).
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Policy funding
FASDEP II aims to provide steady funding of agricultural initiatives. However,
maintaining the financial resources necessary to support prior policies has been a major
challenge throughout Ghana’s policy history. For example, many programs of the 1990s
were created through and funded by the World Bank. This funding was discontinued,
and subsequently, so were the policies. The same was true of the National Agricultural
Extension Project and the National Agricultural Research Project, until the Agricultural
Services Sub-sector Investment Project renewed their funding. Ties with Development
Partners are also being strengthened, which is improving budgetary support.
FASDEP II intends to elicit funding from the Government, development partners,
private sector, civil society, and international financial institutions. The Multi Donor
Budget Support, which was already adopted in 2003, acts in accordance with the Growth
and Poverty Reduction Strategy in providing additional funding to the Ghanaian
government (Ghana Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2008). Funding
strategies are also aligned with the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (Ministry of
Food and Agriculture 2007: 53). The Policy listed the following as potential causes of
failure: inadequate funding by the Government, slow allocation of funding by the
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, lack of attention paid to the agricultural
sector by the District Assemblies (although one of its departments is the District
Directorate of Agriculture), lack of participation by other agencies, limited private sector
participation, and inadequate producer response (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007:
54).
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The budget that METASIP requires for its implementation greatly exceeds
estimated available financial resources; the funding gap is approximately two-thirds of
the estimated cost (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: xiv). Additional expenditures
on top of this for infrastructure improvements are also recommended (Ministry of Food
and Agriculture 2010: xiii). However, the Policy expects the private sector to step up to
close the gap between desired and currently feasible levels of funding. Additional funds
to be allocated toward METASIP are expected to increase by six percent annually
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: xiii).
METASIP aims to invest heavily in private-public partnerships to reduce the
amount of public capital necessary and to push market-driven initiatives (Ministry of
Food and Agriculture 2010: xiii). In doing this, governmental funding is expected to be
“recovered” as well. This is considered necessary because MoFA spending is projected
to increase by about 30 percent (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: xiv). There
currently exists no formal means of engaging the private sector and civil society with
agencies within the agricultural sector, but achievement of such by 2011 is outlined in
METASIP (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 55).
Because the gap between the projected funds and costs is so great, certain
programs are given much greater precedence, as supporting all is clearly not feasible.
The two given the highest priority are Programme 1: Food Security and Emergency
Preparedness and 2: Increased Growth in Incomes. However, the sum of the estimated
costs of these two programs exceeds that of projected available funding by about twosevenths (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: xiv, xv). In addition, the three
programs that are not given priority—sustainable management of land and the
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environment, science and technology for food and agricultural development, and
institutional coordination—would improve food security and long-term economic
growth.
As called for by FASDEP II, at least ten percent of the government’s budget is to
be dedicated to the expansion of the agricultural sector, in accordance with the Maputo
Declaration. However, the government spent just nine percent of its budget on
agriculture in 2009 (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: xiii).

Research
FASDEP II focuses on improving value addition, research endeavors,
productivity, and market access. However, current research endeavors are ineffective.
The Ministry of Food and Agriculture recognized that there is “low uptake of research
findings by stakeholders” and “duplication of research efforts”. Further coordination
with NGOs, domestic and foreign research institutions is necessary to optimize
efficiency. Research is necessary to optimize “development of value chains of
commodities targeted for food security, income growth and diversification, external
markets, and linkage with industry” and improve policy. Improving the relevance of
agricultural technologies and promoting “demand-driven” research are top priorities of
FASDEP II. To achieve this, further participation of farmers is encouraged.
The Ministry of Food and Agriculture envisions playing a role in creating unity
among projects and sub-sectors (i.e. among food, horticultural, and industrial crops). But
in 2007, there was little collaboration within the Ministry of Food and Agriculture and
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among governmental organizations, although FASDEP I created a framework to facilitate
this. In addition, “exit strategies” from donor-funded projects have not been formulated.

Ambitious projected growth rates
FASDEP II goals include attainment of a six to eight percent annual agricultural
growth rate over the next four years, increasing forestry and logging by five percent
annually, and maintaining cocoa’s strength and support of other sectors. These appear to
be repeated mistakes. With diminishing land productivity and availability, it is
impossible to attain these goals without drastically increasing productivity per unit of
land, unless the few remaining preserved forests are encroached upon. However,
infrastructure improvement is once again pushed. This is a step in the right direction, as
it will improve input access and produce marketability.

Sustainability
FASDEP II is also making sure that sub-sector policies are consistent with
FASDEP II objectives, as these provide the framework for implementing the Policy
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 24). One such focus is sustainable land
management (SLM) practices. All agricultural policies and plans are required under
FASDEP II to be evaluated by Strategic Environmental Assessments and every project by
an Environmental Impact Assessment.
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Attempts to increase crop yield
To achieve food security, FASDEP II aims to develop no more than five staple
crops nationally, and MoFA will only support one or two crops in each district. This is
so that only those crops which have the best comparative advantage and are most
desirable in markets will be produced. However, diversification would actually increase
security, as the crops would be collectively much less susceptible to pests and disease.
FASDEP II aimed to introduce high-yielding crops with short growth periods,
improve post-harvest storage and processing, and collaborate with the Ministry of
Transportation (for road cargo) and the Ministry of Harbours and Railways to enhance
crop distribution. Because Ghanaian agencies are jealous and competitive with each
other, this collaboration would be an enormous step forward if successful.
Diversification into tree crops, vegetables, and poultry—based on comparative
advantage—is also a FASDEP II strategy. Improving agricultural practices is another
priority, as this has great marketability and efficiency ramifications. Improvements in
infrastructure and delivery of services are prioritized. FASDEP II also favors increased
production of certain cash crops, such as mango, oil palm, rubber, plantain, and citrus
fruits. METASIP intends to add cotton, soybean, and sheanuts to the targeted crops in
the northern regions, which have much higher levels of poverty (Ministry of Food and
Agriculture 2010: 36).
METASIP aims to increase male and female income earned from cash crop
production by 20 percent and 30 percent, respectively, by 2015. To achieve this, the
following initiatives are to be employed: increasing seed growers’ capacity, educating
agricultural producers about improved technologies, increasing cash crop farmers’
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capacities (in order to improve efficiency and product quality), and to facilitate cash crop
producers’ access to credit (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 37).

Urban Agriculture
Urban agriculture is promoted under both FASDEP II and METASIP as a
“sustainable alternative means of livelihood for poor migrants” (Ministry of Food and
Agriculture 2010: 42). It accounts for over 50 percent of food consumed in Accra
(Maddox-Fisher 2010). Urban farming “insulates the urban poor from price shocks”;
price inflation, particularly on foods, is rampant in Ghana. However, urban farmers are
often in a very precarious situation, as farms are often seized or sold to developers. In
addition, crops and livestock are vulnerable to toxic chemicals, as dirty waters are often
used (Brunhuber 2008); untreated waste water is the main source of irrigation for urban
agriculture (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 42). Urban agriculture occurs
“anywhere there’s a patch of green” in the cities, such as near busy roads and in dumps
(Brunhuber 2008). Plot sizes are roughly 0.001 to 0.2 hectares in urban areas, and these
are diminishing with “dredging of main drains” and land development. Decreasing soil
fertility due to insufficient (or nonexistent) fallow periods is also problematic, as in more
traditional agricultural practices. Most urban agricultural activities are legally permitted.
But within Accra, agriculture must be registered with the metropolitan officer of health if
cultivation is occurring outside of one’s land (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010:
42). METASIP intends to conduct brucellosis and tuberculosis screening of milk
collected in urban areas and to “organize mass vaccination, endo and ectoparasitic
interventions against the endemic diseases in the peri-urban areas” (Ministry of Food and
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Agriculture 2010: 43). However, if these safeguards fail to be implemented, the health
hazards of urban agriculture could outweigh the benefits.

Gender
Many urban farmers are women who have left their homes due to domestic
violence (Brunhuber 2008). Domestic abuse is prevalent in Ghana and viewed as an
“inevitable” stage in relationships, but in only two percent of cases in which women
sought legal interventions were women advised to press charges. In addition, only three
percent of cases in which women press charges lead to arrest (Sarpong 2002). Wife
beating is viewed as “an acceptable norm of society”, and it is viewed as a “form of
discipline” rather than abuse. Women also have limited means of supporting themselves
(and their children) independently, as they often are not permitted to hold property (OfeiAboagye 1994).
Gender equality is another new goal of FASDEP II. For adequate human resource
development, FASDEP II aims to increase private sector participation, cost effectiveness,
and gender equity. To increase female participation, the Policy requires affirmative
action in MoFA training and recruitment. An audit of the Ministry’s human resources is
also outlined. FASDEP II also calls for improved institutional structures, collection and
use of gender disaggregated data, and conducting gender analysis of agricultural
programs so that workloads do not become skewed. During the METASIP consultative
process, gender representation was taken into account (Ministry of Food and Agriculture
2007: 2).
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Poor product quality
A large volume of exports is returned by foreign purchasers due to inadequate
quality. The main cause of this is limited knowledge in external market requirements.
Logistics in marketing is also a great area for improvement. In addition, a weak legal
infrastructure discourages contractual agreements in production, processing, and
marketing. Agricultural processors typically receive “low, poor quality and irregular
supplies of raw materials”.
FASDEP II also aims to improve agricultural practices and create stricter quality
control standards so that exports will not be rejected by importers due to sanitary reasons.
Creating “clusters” of small- to medium-scale farmers and producers is another goal, as
this would improve access to technical advice and services. The Policy also hopes to
improve and enhance local agricultural processing via improved technology and training.
Capacity-building of extension services—whose primary function is to educate
farmers on improved farming methods (this could therefore help to improve quality and
efficiency of exports)—provided by MoFA is another priority. In 2006, approximately
one out of ten land-using farmers over 21 years of age who were surveyed had not heard
of the extension service (Boateng 2006: 19-29). Only 2.5 percent knew that one of the
services provided by the agency was the supply of inputs, and 30.8 percent reported
discontinuation of extension service staff visits. Only 41.5 percent were satisfied, with
just 37.9 percent viewing the extension service as reliable. While 38.1 percent reported
gaining new knowledge or technology, only 22.2 percent received advice that led to
higher yields. Of the 58.5 percent who were unsatisfied, 47 percent believed the services
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to be too expensive, 46.9 percent unreliable, and 6.1 percent received no follow-up
(Boateng 2006: 19-29).

Irrigation
MoFA recognizes that water is used inefficiently by formal irrigation facilities,
and that “most irrigation schemes are designed and operated with little consideration for
land and water degradation and energy efficiency”. FASDEP II aims to increase
productivity from 30 percent to 80 percent. Use of small-scale pumps for subsistence
farmers along perennial bodies of water, alternative methods of water delivery, and
access of adequate water to urban farmers are also promoted. A disproportionately large
amount of northern Ghana inhabitants is engaged in agricultural activities, although that
region is semiarid and farming completely depends upon rainfall.
Enhancing irrigation capacity would be a means of reducing uncertainties in
agricultural production due to climatic variability; as of 2008, only 0.5 percent of
agricultural products were irrigated. Increasing the proportion of irrigated lands is also
desirable according to policymakers because it enables the same piece of land to be used
more frequently (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 26). However, soil depletion,
which is currently the greatest limiting factor in agriculture, would greatly increase.
Although the targeted irrigation intensification by METASIP is a 50 percent increase by
2015, the targeted increase in productivity is only 25 percent (Ministry of Food and
Agriculture 2010: 33). These priorities are misplaced; merely increasing the efficiency
increases capacity in turn, but the opposite is not the case.
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One of the greatest barriers to establishing irrigation infrastructure is the cost;
initiation is “capital intensive” and creation requires long-term investment to yield
returns. The Policy proposes that irrigation infrastructure be developed as a public good,
likely leased to private associations and management bodies “to ensure efficiency”. It
was noted: “irrigated agriculture can only be viable if there are backward linkages to
infrastructure, inputs, and research and forward linkages to agro-processing and
marketing” (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 27).

Plant disease and pests
One of FASDEP’s goals is to reduce crop pest losses from 30-50 percent to 10-15
percent. Coupled with storage losses of roughly 50 percent, most of Ghana’s crops are
wasted. Large causes are exotic pests, minimal adoption of certified planting materials
and means of plant protection by farmers (especially those who cultivate food crops), and
weak enforcement of regulations. In addition, pesticides are commonly misapplied, and
importation standards of recipient countries often change. Previous policies with the
same objectives are the Guidelines for the National Plant Protection Policy, Prevention
and Control of Pests and Diseases of Plants Act (Act 307, 1965), NRCD 100 of 1972,
Seed Inspection and Certification Decree, and the Pesticides Controls and Management
Act (Act 528, 1996).
FASDEP II aims to deal with the plant pest and disease problem by enforcing an
international standard and improving “plant quarantine systems” at points of entry, as by
increasing collaboration among the Plant Protection and Regulatory Services Directorate,
Customs Excise and Preventive Service, and Ghana Immigration Service.
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Efficiency improvements
The targeted agricultural sector annual growth rate continues to be six percent, as
was the goal of Operation Feed Yourself. Closing the gap between potential and
observed yields by increasing productivity on the land (rather than encroaching into other
land areas) would help Ghana to meet this targeted annual growth rate. The difference
between potential and actual yields is approximately 50 percent for most crops (Ministry
of Food and Agriculture 2010: 70).
The difference between actual yields and estimated optimal yields is up to 55
percent for certain crops. This is mostly due to the limited use of inputs; only five to ten
percent of subsistence farmers with one or fewer hectares of land used fertilizer, whereas
30 percent of farmers with over five hectares used fertilizer (which is still quite low).
Inputs are limited primarily from high cost, limited availability and lack of confidence in
input effectiveness (due to adulterated products) (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010:
23).
Post-harvest losses are astronomical; 35 percent of corn and 34 percent of cassava
is lost (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 24). METASIP aims to reduce these
between 20 and 50 percent by 2015 (the targeted percentage decrease in waste being
dependent on the crop) (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 31). One way is by
promoting processing, which would improve the products’ shelf lives.
Reducing post-harvest losses is another focus of the Policy. METASIP intends to
decrease losses of mango, plantain, tomato, pineapple, papaya, and citrus between 25 and
50 percent by 2015. The means outlined to achieve this objective are training (of
extension staff, producers, processors, and marketers), improving storage facilities and
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transportation, promoting commodity “cold chain handling” (which will likely be
particularly difficult, since this infrastructure is basically inexistent at the moment), and
using “appropriate handling containers” (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 38).
Some proposed initiatives to improve transportation of agricultural goods are: linking
district capitals with paved roads, connecting at least 70 percent of communities by roads
to district capitals, and constructing farm trucks in agricultural areas (which is a bad idea,
since the infrastructure does not exist; this would likely be fantastically inefficient)
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 41).

Land management
Land degradation threatens approximately 63 percent of Ghana’s land area.
Leading causes of this are traditional bush burning (with insufficient fallow periods),
improper use of irrigation, and improper distribution of agro-chemicals (Ministry of Food
and Agriculture 2010: 46). Severe erosion also occurs, as agriculture is conducted on
extremely steep gradients. Land is limited, and livestock is an inefficient use of land, but
FASDEP II aims for a 50 percent increase in output of animal products by 2015.
In 2009, the Ghanaian government introduced a 37 million Cedi fertilizer subsidy
to increase the affordability of fertilizer, particularly for small-scale food crop farmers
(Ghana News Agency). The subsidy is in effect such that fertilizer costs from December
2008 would appear to be unchanged for the farmer, even though the unsubsidized
fertilizer price was exactly double by the following April. With the unsubsidized price,
the Minister of Food and Agriculture estimated fertilizer use by small scale farmers to
collectively decline by approximately 70 percent, cutting cereal production by 20 percent.

92

This corresponds to a production shortfall that would cost 62.5 million USD to import.
Therefore, with these estimations, the subsidy is less costly. Measures to prevent abuse
of this policy are coupon allocation, border control, and random inspections (Ghana New
Agency 2009). Since the use of fertilizer has been limited, perhaps further discounted
prices would create even greater economic benefits.
In order to predict climatic and weather changes that would place certain areas at
higher risks, MoFA intends to collaborate with the Ghana Meteorological Agency. The
Ministry also intends to encourage farmers to prepare, in addition to providing assistance
for adaptation to and mitigation against the weathers’ impacts (Ministry of Food and
Agriculture 2010: 46). These include soil improvement efforts, introduction of droughtand flood-tolerant crop species, and growing high-yielding and short-duration varieties.
However, short-duration crop species would be undesirable if they were used for the
purpose of more frequent harvest, as this would rapidly deplete the soil. And yet again,
cost, limited access to inputs, and lack of credit impede the introduction of necessary
improvements (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 47).
Another pressure exerted on the lands is encroachment by other sectors. “Prime
agricultural land” is used for other industrial applications and housing projects (Ministry
of Food and Agriculture 2010: 81). METASIP aims to increase institutional capacity to
push sustainable land management (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 47). The
Ministry of Food and Agriculture states: “an effective policy would enhance the positive
influences through carbon sequestration, contribution of tree cover for conservation and
improved quality of soil, protection of watersheds, and enhancement of the beauty of
natural landscapes” (2010: 79). MoFA also intends to promote creation and
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implementation of 50 community land improvement plans each year (Ministry of Food
and Agriculture 2010: 48). Like FASDEP II, METASIP was created with the intention of
being evaluated by a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), which “focus(es) on
the four main areas of sustainability, i.e. natural resources, socio-cultural issues,
economic issues and institutional issues” (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 79).
The Ministry recognizes Sustainable Land Management as a means of improving the
livelihoods of the economically disadvantaged, as it is “key to sustainable agriculture and
has the potential to minimize waste in the sector” (Ministry of Food and Agriculture
2010: 80). METASIP also intends to foster enforcement and revision of the Plant and
Fertilizer Act (803) of 2010, which was created to regulate plant, seed and fertilizer
production (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 28).

Processing
Although incorrect assumptions of profitability are linked with “value addition”
from processing (processing may make the net profit earned lower than without),
METASIP aims to increase processing because of its ability to increase shelf life.
Warehouse storage could also stabilize prices. Hence, METASIP aims to upgrade and reestablish adequate storage facilities. However, processing could worsen the nutritional
deficiencies. But fortunately, agro-processing would be conducted “in an
environmentally safe and sustainable manner” (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010:
25). Increasing storage and processing capacity in the private sector are other methods
within METASIP to decrease post-harvest losses (Ministry of Food and Agriculture
2010: 31).
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The Policy negatively views selling raw agricultural products, as they are “bulky,
with short shelf lives and inconvenient to use”. To solve this perceived problem, the
Policy aims to produce “at least two new commercially viable products…from each of
staple crops, horticultural crops, livestock and fisheries by 2015” (Ministry of Food and
Agriculture 2010: 39). METASIP intends to increase “rural industrial processing” of
cassava, oil palm, shea nuts, cashew news, soybeans, and groundnuts by up to 40 percent
by 2015 (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 41). However, this is notoriously
inefficient.

Mechanization and other improved technologies
There is limited use of agricultural machinery, which is costly and constrained
with limited availability. MoFA aims to mechanize agricultural activities through
collaboration with the private sector, promotion of local tractor assembly, and
development of human capacity (in both the public and private sectors) to manage,
operate, and repair the machinery. FASDEP II also promotes use of animal traction by
establishing support centers.
Older farmers have little technical knowledge. Youth have been targeted, as they
are trained in agriculture and not attracted to it. There is a great lack of specialists as
well. FASDEP II aims to increase financial accessibility and increased use of more
advanced technologies to attract the youth to agriculture.
In 2005, approximately 40 percent of farmers surveyed used some degree of
mechanized agriculture. The most commonly mechanized activity is land preparation. A
large area for improvement is processing; access to the equipment is limited, and the
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machinery is inefficient. Locally-manufactured equipment is “not up to food grade
standard”. In rice regions, which are vulnerable to floods, mechanization would vastly
increase efficiency in agricultural production. This is because the fields cannot be
worked after the floods, and machinery would enable the lands to be planted before the
rains, so that optimal harvesting could occur (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010:
27). METASIP aims to increase agricultural “mechanization”, by establishing “at least
one private sector led mechanisation centre” per district by 2015 (Ministry of Food and
Agriculture 2010: 27, 35). Initiatives to support this include NGO collaboration to
increase animal traction use, increased FBO ownership of large machinery, improving
access to credit (which appears to be the prevailing theme of agricultural policy), and
training technicians (which is not currently problematic). Another important goal relating
to mechanization is adoption of food-grade processing technology (Ministry of Food and
Agriculture 2010: 35).
Improved technologies could play various other roles in increasing agricultural
production. Better crop varieties and use of media to improve extension services and
information dissemination are only a couple of examples (Ministry of Food and
Agriculture 2010: 28).
Technology implementation and development is yet again listed as a priority to
achieve sustainable practices. Accordingly, initiatives to support this are: data collection
on land degradation, integration of natural resource management and evaluation, and
publishing research findings (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 48). Though
MoFA admitted that research receives very little funding (as of 2010), METASIP reflects
an intention to create an effective monitoring and incentive system for land use
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management by 2012 (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 49). Although this is
necessary, it appears to be yet another empty initiative. Many of the specific expected
outcomes are oddly vague, such as increasing the agricultural technologies developed by
25 percent by 2015 (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 49, 51). However, the
initiative to create a functional communicative strategy within MoFA by 2012 (Ministry
of Food and Agriculture 2010: 53) is concrete, necessary, and feasible.

Standard of living implications
The first Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I) of 2003-5—along with its
successors, GPRS II (2006-9) and Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda I
(2010-3) (all were developed in concert with the World Bank)—aims to promote rural
development through the modernization of agriculture. The agricultural sector is
considered integral in “raising the average real incomes of Ghanaians as a whole”
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 1).
The strategies to be used for nutritional improvement are nutrition and health
information and food fortification. One of the assumptions on which FASDEP II relies is
that “enhanced incomes will also reinforce food security through financial access to
food”. A later study showed that while poverty levels significantly decreased between
1998 and 2003, malnutrition (which resulted in “stunted” children) increased (Ministry of
Food and Agriculture 2010: 23). Hence, increase in incomes is not enough to solve the
problem of malnutrition. Part of this is due to limited knowledge of macro- and micronutrition. Food production should also take these aspects into account, such as through
food fortification (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 24). METASIP has the
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objective of halving the prevalence of stunting in children by 2015. To do so, growth and
consumption of nutritious crops (such as sweet potato, leafy vegetables, and “High
Quality Protein Maize”) would be promoted, as would be the development of other
nutrient-rich staples. Other initiatives include micro-nutrient fortification, availability of
more healthy foods through a school feeding program, and nutritional education
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 30).
Of the Ghanaians who fall below the extreme poverty line, 18.2 percent are
chronically food insecure. Another 10.3 percent of those who are “poor” but above the
poverty line suffer from intermittent food insecurity (Ministry of Food and Agriculture
2010: 22). Subsistence farmers also have less diverse crops, which further worsens the
rural poor’s economic security. However, activities outside of farming (but still in the
agricultural sector) could help increase diversity and subsequently lower the
precariousness of many farmers’ existences (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 24).
Hence, METASIP intends to increase production from bee keeping, mushroom and snail
farming, and “small stocks” by 20-50 percent by 2015 (Ministry of Food and Agriculture
2010: 39).
METASIP aims to reduce the number of food insecure households by 20 percent
before 2015 (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 32). One of the proposed initiatives
is engaging more impoverished citizens in off-farm agricultural activities. To do so,
micro and small enterprises, entrepreneurial training, exploitation of the correct markets,
and partnerships with NGOs would be promoted (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010:
30). The ultimate goal of the Policy is to improve nutrition to obtain “higher productivity
and reproduction” (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 23).
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METASIP aimed to promote emergency preparedness by being able to provide
food to people affected by disaster. Poor weather, pests, and disease are the main causes
of food insecurity. Current capacity to respond to these is limited. Forecasts and steps to
become better-prepared would help to improve emergency response. The Policy also
suggests that the border controls and related organizations be used to monitor pest and
disease outbreaks and to quench them. The Ghana Meteorological Agency is expected to
play a more active role in local forecasting and communicating its findings. Food stocks
are yet another proposed initiative (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 26).

Availability of financial resources
MoFA has practically no control over the financial institutions that provide loans
to cultivators. However, the Ministry pushes group formation to obtain resources
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 46), although means of obtaining loans (via
collateral) is structured around individuals. Lack of funding is probably agriculture’s
biggest constraint, at least partly due to low rates of loan recovery. Agricultural credit is
not disbursed in a timely manner, and medium- to long-term loans are least available,
which greatly limits investments that could increase sustainability. Through the FASDEP
II, MoFA aims to improve operators’ credit management, create more efficient means of
applying for loans, increase farmers’ education regarding loan procedures, increase loan
monitoring, encourage financiers to accept a wider range of items as collateral, strengthen
micro-financing and informal means of funding, promote the use of FBOs in delivering
financial services, push the creation of an Agricultural Development Fund for mediumand long-term funding, and increase female access (Ministry of Food and Agriculture
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2007: 46). However, many of these means to solving the financing problem are outside
of MoFA’s formal and informal control; the financial institutions that often are not paid
back from agricultural loans ultimately have the control.
High interest rates discourage agricultural investment; although they are slowly
falling, rates still fall between 20 and 33.5 percent. With a volatile annual rate of
inflation that averages to about 15 percent, this corresponds to real interest rates falling
roughly between five and 18.5 percent. This is mostly due to the risk of loans to the
agricultural sector. However, extremely high interest rates may compound this problem,
since those who are more conservative and less willing to take risks might not accept
those terms. In addition, commercial producers are much more likely to receive loans,
due to their higher levels of productivity (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 57).
The Government provides “tax holidays” to the agricultural sector of up to ten
years (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 57). However, these have had little effect
on the agricultural sector, as high energy costs and poor infrastructure have restrained the
sector much more than taxation (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 57-8). MoFA
will encourage the government to allocate more of its funds towards the agricultural
sector. There has been proposed removal of the corporate tax on producers and
processers in the agricultural sector as well (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 58).
However, this only expands the difference in opportunities between larger producers and
smallholders.
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Development partners and collaboration
FASDEP also outlines the role of “development partners”. The Policy
emphasizes their role in providing “financial and technical resources”, engaging in policy
dialogue, and concerting their actions with other stakeholders (Ministry of Food and
Agriculture 2007: 49). The development partners are also expected to monitor and
evaluate, play a large role in research, and improve human development (Ministry of
Food and Agriculture 2007: 50). In short, FASDEP II largely depends upon the
development partners’ efforts. That would be viable only if they cooperate.
FASDEP II outlines a major role for MoFA in monitoring and evaluation by
carrying out annual performance reviews and publishing annual reports to communicate
those results (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 53). The Ministry is given the role
of coordinating the actions of the development partners. The Policy gives the National
Development Planning Commission the role of overseeing partnerships among the
private sector, civil society organizations, and the public sector (Ministry of Food and
Agriculture 2007: 50). MoFA is given a large amount of responsibility in this area as
well.
This area of the Policy is expected to be successful. The development partners
have expressed the desire to collaborate, but no policies have outlined this previously
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 50).
Like FASDEP II—on which METASIP is largely based—stakeholder
consultation is prioritized. Extensive processes were carried out to ensure that feedback,
from groups such as sector ministries, researchers, NGOs, private sector actors,
educational institutions, and regional and district officers, was used to formulate
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METASIP. In the consultative process, public vs. private sector representation was
balanced (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 2). This was used to create a “zero
draft”, which was then discussed by stakeholder groups, such as Development Partners,
before the final draft was formulated (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 2, 4).
Stakeholder feedback on the “zero draft” was collected in each of the ten regions, and
agricultural input supply actors also participated in penning the First Draft. The draft was
further circulated for comment and discussion in regional consultation workshops before
its finalization. Like FASDEP II, METASIP promotes collaboration among
governmental organizations, the private sector, and civil society (Ministry of Food and
Agriculture 2010: 4). Customizing education and training programs to meet the needs of
the agricultural sector and encouraging recruitment of women are further means of
addressing the lack of agricultural specialists.

Policy coordination
The Ministry of Food and Agriculture recognizes the need for collaboration. The
Ministry intends to lead coordination among all stakeholders (Ministry of Food and
Agriculture 2007: 48). To do this, it intends to foster dialogue in policymaking and
effectively use research findings.
MoFA is expected to organize the logistic aspects of the Policy, play a large role
in lobbying and advocacy, and develop inspections for agricultural exports. FASDEP
also outlines an audit of MoFA’s human resources by the Human Resource Development
and Management Directorate. MoFA is also expected to assess the consistencies of
policies that relate to agricultural policy and those policies’ impacts on the sector
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(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 51). In doing so, data are expected to be
disaggregated by sector and scale of farming endeavor so that future policies can be
improved (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 52).
The Ministry is also given the responsibility of analyzing the impacts of macro
polices on “the competitiveness of key agricultural exports and the effect of imports on
domestic production” (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 51). Although this is
pertinent to MoFA and the agricultural sector, FASDEP II should be focused on welfare
rather than on promoting a particular industry; this has been the bane of several previous
policies.
For district-level implementation, FASDEP II objectives are to be given priority
according to the district’s needs. In addition, districts “will select 2 crops or livestock
(breeds) annually to focus on for effective use of resources but not neglecting other crops
or livestock from normal course of development”. District-level plans should also be
developed through collaboration with other stakeholders. “Lack of composite budgeting”
is noted as a “major limitation”. In addition, district officers tend to work individually
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 52).
Key problems that were identified with agricultural production that METASIP
aims to solve are limited and inefficient irrigation, low adoption of advanced technology,
high post-harvest losses, lack of efficient processing capability, inadequate financing,
poor disbursement of extension services, lack of skills, and competition from imports
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: xi). METASIP intends to use already existing
agency and stakeholder structures, and once again, MoFA is to lead (Ministry of Food
and Agriculture 2010: xii).
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METASIP is to create systems of evaluation and standardization for all
agricultural commodities. These would apply to both domestic and export markets. Use
of proper labeling is a strategy (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 45). The
Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (SAKSS) was established to support
METASIP by aiding in its implementation and providing improvements. SAKSS will
include National Agriculture Research System institutions and local think tanks (Ministry
of Food and Agriculture 2010: 74). The role of the Secretariat is established to
coordinate the Steering Committee, SAKSS, and the Policy Dialogue Group (Ministry of
Food and Agriculture 2010: 75).
In addition, a monitoring and evaluation system specific to the agricultural sector
has been implemented since its 2007 creation to observe effective and problematic areas
within the agricultural sector plan. However, the system faces the following problems:
inadequately skilled staff, unreliable and inadequate technology (primarily, poor internet
connectivity), and staff exhaustion (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 85). The
office of the President, Parliament, NDPC, MOFEP, Ghana Statistical Service, MDAs,
Civil Society, NGOs, and various other organizations are involved in the monitoring and
evaluation process. The Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Division of the
Ministry of Food and Agriculture coordinates this system (Ministry of Food and
Agriculture 2010: 86). In addition, use of FBOs is to be intensified in METASIP
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 40).
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Limited dissemination of information
Governmental bureaus have not coordinated well with each other. For example,
the national universities and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)
often conduct agricultural and other research without communicating with each other or
the Ministry of Agriculture. Therefore, many research endeavors are repeated, but the
farmers are unaware of the findings. In the rare event that some communications occur,
typically only commercial, large-scale farmers benefit. The improved seeds are usually
only available for cash/export crops. Though extension officers inform small-scale
farmers about insecticides, fertilizers, improved seeds, better farming methods,
agricultural equipment, and machinery, subsistence efforts do not gain enough of a profit
to economically justify these investments. Though the Ministry of Agriculture has
started an irrigation program to hedge against climatic uncertainties, only growers of
export or “import substitution” crops, such as rice, sugar cane, and cotton, receive the
benefits; the typical consumer does not benefit. Though the commercial farmers benefit
from governmental investments and subsidies, the “food substitutes” are too expensive
for the typical consumer to take advantage of them (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25).

Mistrust of the Government rooted in a history of ineffective policy
The Ghanaian governments have been notorious for “giving orders and issuing
decrees with great fanfare but without adequate plans for implementation”. This has led
to a general sense of dissatisfaction with the government. Results from a survey on the
public sentiment following Operation Feed Yourself implementation support this
conclusion. Of the consumers who were questioned, 93 percent felt that they could not
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easily feed their families, as 80-90 percent of their incomes were spent on food.
However, the customers believed the government—not the farmers—to be at fault. The
majority of participants were upset with the policy; 90 percent believed OFY to be a
failure, and 80 percent were unsatisfied with “the handling of food production in Ghana”.
A very small minority—four percent—believed the government had kept most of its
promises, 55 percent believed that only some were kept, and 35 percent felt that none had
been followed through. The vast majority of respondents believed policy-makers and
executors were failing. However, the majority of policy executors disagreed. Though 75
percent of policy executors believed food production to be “somewhat adequate”;
weather conditions were blamed (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25).
Many ineffective policy patterns are repeated. Although state farms were a major
failure in the 1960s, they are being re-introduced, again with the aim of increasing food
exports and also to encourage agricultural jobs for the youth. Some abandoned farms and
those operating at less than full capacity have been targeted, but the major goal is to
decrease unemployment by bringing youth into the agricultural sector (Ghanaian Times
2009). Many view state farms and expansion of agriculture as a means to ensure food
security. Because of this, the re-introduction of state farms to attract the youth to
agriculture is one of the major platforms of the New Vision Party for the 2012 elections
(Ghana News Agency 2010).

Conclusion
The agricultural sector continues to contribute the largest share of GDP. The
country’s economic performance is closely related to that of the agricultural sector
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(Asuming-Brempong 2003). Following the failure of Operation Feed Yourself in the
1970s, Girder et al (1980: 14-25) noted that declining food production in Ghana seems to
be caused by a strong bias in public policy towards supporting export crops. Regardless,
export crop production remains a priority, while domestic demands are neglected. Those
export crops (like cocoa) were heavily taxed by the marketing board, although these
marketing boards were created to protect producers by offering price stability. However,
recent policies, such as FASDEP II and MEGASIP, encourage departure from
dependence in cocoa and similar crops rooted in colonial times.
The effects of policies promoting agricultural activities (through initiatives such
as promotion of export commodities, exploitation of timber and forest resources, mining,
and use of agrichemicals) have been largely detrimental to the environment. However,
the overall impacts—when livelihood is also taken into account—are mixed (AsumingBrempong 2003). Recovery from the recession of the 1980s is one such example. Older
policies have tended to aggregate various categories of crops that have profoundly
different needs for efficient cultivation and processing. But requirements of
Environmental Impact Assessments, promotion of disaggregated data in research
endeavors and other progressive initiatives in recent policies, such as METASIP, are
starting to solve these problems.
Although Ghana’s economy is slowly diversifying, diminishing agricultural
productivity due to progressively depleting soils is problematic. This is mostly due to the
combination of a complete lack of fertilizer, shifting cultivation and inadequate fallow
periods. METASIP has enacted subsidies so that the cost of fertilizer is unchanged from
that of the previous year so that fertilizer use would not be discouraged. However, recent
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policies have not subsidized fertilizer further, although this could greatly bolster
agricultural productivity and prevent soil degradation. Pesticides and herbicides are often
used in too great of abundance, leading to contaminated foods and groundwatercontaminating toxic runoff. And while previous policies encouraged shifting away from
agriculture, FASDEP II and METASIP are promoting increased activity within the
sector.
The economy flipped between very strong state control and completely laissezfaire economic policy. Because of the resultant confusion, there continues to be lack of
confidence in the government’s ability to formulate effective agricultural policy. “Empty
promises” by the government further erode confidence in it and diminish policy
obedience. Policies have been ineffective mostly due to lack of adequate funding.
METASIP is in a financially precarious position, since it overlooks the fact that its
projected budget grossly overshoots available funds.
Until recently, policy neglected smallholder farmers. Although FASDEP II and
MEGASIP have addressed this and problems with gender inequality, these problems are
deep-rooted and therefore remain. It is currently impossible to tell if these are other
idealistic promises that will never be fulfilled or the beginning of real change.
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Chapter 5: Summary and Policy Recommendations

Over-zealousness to industrialize the country and a colonial mindset favoring
resource exploitation in prior decades has crippled the Ghanaian economy. The extent to
which natural resources were wastefully exploited limits the ability of economic actors in
the forestry and agricultural sectors to support themselves, more so in manner that can be
sustained. Over 65 percent of Ghana’s land area is devoted to agricultural endeavors, and
agricultural productivity per hectare is declining, forcing farmers to expand cultivated
lands. Available land is sparse, and only about 20 percent of the land is forested (Trading
Economics 2010). Therefore, the great economic successes that Ghana has enjoyed
recently must be viewed cautiously, in light of the rampant exploitation of the resources
upon which Ghana relies.
Some harmful trends have discontinued, such as policy incentives for sheer forest
exploitation regardless of the economic implications. However, there continues to be
inadequate funding to invest in more viable long-term options, neglect of small-share
operations, lack of recognition for communal ownership, and a pervasive view that
unexploited forests are useless.
Once again, Ghana is in the process of revitalizing state farms, which were a
definitive failure during the 1960s and 1970s. And to fund various agricultural
endeavors, the Government encourages aggregation of smallholders with larger
agricultural endeavors. Most logging companies disregard regulations with impunity.
The vast majority of this timber is exported to industrialized countries. However, recent
policy aims to verify exports to the European Union.
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The lack of funding available to smallholders, particularly in the agricultural
sector, greatly inhibits Ghana’s development towards enhanced food security, educational
opportunities, and health care. The agricultural and forestry sector provides by far the
most support to the Ghanaian economy, and the majority of operations are subsistence
efforts. Without adequate credit, the investments necessary to foster long-term economic
support are not possible. The cost of something so basic as fertilizer is prohibitive to
most farmers. This degrades the soil, greatly harming the Ghanaian economy and
threatening future generations. Economic analyses have shown that the cost of fertilizer
would be more than merely offset by the increased crop yields.
Although agriculture, forestry, and fishing contributed a very large proportion of
the 2005 economic growth5, only 1.2 percent on average of the Government’s annual
expenditures is allocated to the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (and Ministry of
Fisheries, which only became a separate entity in 2005). Government expenditures on
agriculture expands to 5.2 percent when the Department of Forestry under the Ministry of
Lands and Forestry, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, and COCOBOD (the
cocoa marketing board) is included (Benin et al 2008: 10). In addition, the Agriculture,
Forestry, and Fishing sector was allocated 8.1 percent of credit by deposit money banks,
a 10.1 percent decline from 2005. All other sectors’ credit allocations increased, with the
exception of “miscellaneous” services. Although manufacturing contributed only 8.6
percent of Ghana’s overall economic growth in 2005 (the industrial sectors aggregated
contributing 23.9 percent—therefore, non-cocoa crops and livestock alone contribute
more than the entire industrial sector), 18.9 percent of credit was allocated to

5

Agriculture, forestry, and fishing contributed 41.4 percent of the 2005 economic growth, crops and
livestock alone 25.5 percent, cocoa 9.7 percent, and forestry 3.5 percent.
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manufacturing, a 33 percent increase from 2005. Manufacturing grew by 5.5 percent in
2005, industry by 5.6 percent. Agriculture grew by 6.5 percent, in spite of sparse funding
(GhanaWeb 2006: 23-25, 46). As mentioned previously, this growth is mostly due to
land expansion. In addition, the vast majority of loans to the agricultural sector have
been allocated to large operators that are not locally based and tend to be the worst
environmental offenders. Although loans to smallholders in the agricultural sector have
been considered high-risk in the past, these are necessary to create the changes needed to
sustain Ghana’s economy.
Rural sector industrialization is given too much priority. Policy pushes for timber
processing, which is wasteful because of inferior processing machinery. Attempting to
process all agricultural and forestry products for rapid industrialization is not the most
prudent option when agriculture is far and away the most economically successful sector.
In addition, there is nothing inherently superior in industrialization itself. It is
much less sustainable than a rural economy, and an agriculturally-based economy with
good education and medical services could exist. Manufacturing should not be pushed,
but rather health services, research, and sustainable agricultural practices.
Ghana’s strength lies in its closely-knit communities. Financial resources should
be structured in a manner that is compatible with this. Communal loans might even be
more secure than the more traditional individual loans, as it is less likely that a
community would be unable to pay than an individual. Communal reputation in repaying
loans and cutting off financial resources to defaulting communities could be means of
enforcing loan repayments.
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The backbone of the economy rests on smallholder endeavors in the agricultural
sector. Policy must be crafted in a manner that recognizes this and provides incentives to
act in a sustainable fashion and not comply with illegal loggers. As stated by Onyeiwu et
al in 2010: “Rural farmers in Africa will continue to use resources in unsustainable ways,
as long as they are economically desperate, socially isolated, and politically
marginalized.”
Forcing the timber companies to pay taxes and to follow regulations would make
a large impact. Although the government is likely reluctant to do so for fear of
discouraging business establishment, companies outside of the six or so that actually
followed regulations in registering for permits harm the Ghanaian economy rather than
support it.
Although there have been great improvements in agricultural and forestry policy
itself, these progressive initiatives are often not implemented. Investing a much greater
portion of governmental spending to fund the agricultural sector would greatly pay off.
Simply providing major fertilizer subsidies would be one of the most effective solutions,
assuming that border control is adequate to prevent smuggling. Similarly, motivating use
of more efficient logging machinery would greatly benefit society.
It is imperative that Ghana implements sustainable forestry and agricultural
policy. The majority of its resources have already been wasted, and traditional
subsistence from forest resources is no longer viable. The livelihood of most Ghanaians
now relies upon the performance of the agricultural economy. Increasingly limited land
availability and soil depletion in the face of a continuously growing population place
Ghana in a precarious situation.
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